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This paper seeks to explore the above question by drawing insights from existing literature. 
The existing body of literature is rich in documenting the phenomenon of legal transplants, 
theorising why legal transplants take place and presenting the debate on the relevance of 
local culture to the adaptation of the transplants. In terms of tax transplants, there is an 
emerging strand of literature that examines the unique characteristics of tax transplants, 
the common core of tax law, and the global tax convergence. However, there is a lack of 
analysis focusing on the critical role of processes in legal and tax transplants. Through a case 
study of the Chinese tax transplants, this paper seeks to test the theories of legal 
transplants and to demonstrate the importance of process in successful transplants. It 
examines two types of processes: tax processes and transplantation processes. Tax 
processes include the political process, administrative and compliance process, and dispute 
resolution process. Tax transplantation processes include the process of selection, 
translation, adoption and adaptation. 
 
The central claim of this paper is that processes matter in tax transplants. Taxation science is 
capable of being borrowed and duplicated. Tax processes in a country are defined by its 
general political, legal and institutional culture, and thus vary from country to country. Many 
tax rules or principles are the outcomes of tax processes in the country of origin and their 
implementation depends on a certain set of administrative processes. The transplantation of 
a tax rule or principle is likely to fail if it is done without the necessary processes, or at least, 
without a full appreciation and accommodation of the differences in processes. 
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Daughter:     Daddy, my friends and I will get a gift basket tomorrow for our 
fundraising efforts at school. 
Father:  Good. Make sure you let your friends choose first and you take 
whatever is left. 
Daughter:      No. We will take turns in picking what each of us wants, one at a 
time, until we divide up all the gifts.  
Father:           That sounds good, too. 
 
The conversation above is between my daughter and her dad. Although both agree that 
sharing the gifts is important, they have a different approach to sharing. The daughter 
has a process that is fair to both her and her friends. The father’s idea of sharing 
requires his daughter to be virtuous and to put her friends’ interests first. Having 
grown up in Canada, the daughter is accustomed to using rules and processes, whereas 
the father holds traditional Chinese values dearly and emphasises personal virtues.  
How does this dialogue relate to tax transplantation? It makes me contemplate the 
importance of process in transplanting good tax ideas or ‘scientific’ tax rules from the 
West to China. China and Western countries share the same general objectives of 
taxation: to generate revenue to finance public expenditures, to redistribute social 
income, and to regulate private economic and social activities. China and the West 
also face similar tax problems, such as how to tax high income earners and 
multinational corporations. Yet China and the West have different ways of achieving 
these objectives and dealing with these common problems. To begin with, the political 
and legal systems of China and the West are different. The relationship between 
individuals and the state and the approach to problem solving are also viewed from 
different angles. When China implements a tax rule from the West to solve an 
apparently similar tax problem, to what extent do processes matter? In other words, if 
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the outcome of a process in the West is transplanted to China, can it work well in 
China without similar processes?   
This paper seeks to explore the above question by drawing insights from existing 
literature. The existing body of literature is rich in documenting the phenomenon of 
legal transplants, theorising why legal transplants take place and presenting the debate 
on the relevance of local culture to the adaptation of the transplants. In terms of tax 
transplants, there is an emerging strand of literature that examines the unique 
characteristics of tax transplants, the common core of tax law, and the global tax 
convergence. However, there is a lack of analysis focusing on the critical role of 
processes in legal and tax transplants. Through a case study of the Chinese tax 
transplants, this paper seeks to test the theories of legal transplants and to demonstrate 
the importance of process in successful transplants. It examines two types of 
processes: tax processes and transplantation processes. Tax processes include the 
political process, administrative and compliance process, and dispute resolution 
process. Tax transplantation processes include the process of selection, translation, 
adoption and adaptation. 
The central claim of this paper is that processes matter in tax transplants. Taxation 
science is capable of being borrowed and duplicated. Tax processes in a country are 
defined by its general political, legal and institutional culture, and thus vary from 
country to country. Many tax rules or principles are the outcomes of tax processes in 
the country of origin and their implementation depends on a certain set of 
administrative processes. The transplantation of a tax rule or principle is likely to fail 
if it is done without the necessary processes, or at least, without a full appreciation and 
accommodation of the differences in processes.   
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Part 2 provides a brief review of the 
existing literature on legal transplants and the emerging literature on tax transplants. It 
notes the debate about tax common core and culture-specific tax transplants and the 
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phenomenon of tax transplants in China. Part 3 discusses tax processes and argues 
why tax processes should be considered in tax transplants from one culture to another. 
Tax law is the result of a political and legal process. Taxation is more like science than 
art. Like other scientific disciplines, such as medicine, taxation is about both 
knowledge and process. Part 4 presents a case study of the Chinese tax transplants and 
the importance of selecting and adapting transplants. It shows that the transplantation 
of the arm’s length principle is more successful than the transplantation of the 
progressive tax principle, largely because China introduced the necessary tax 
processes in respect of the former, but not the latter. Part 5 concludes the paper with 
some observations and comments.  
2. Legal (Tax) transplants  
2.1 Evidence of Legal and Tax transplants 
‘Legal transplants’ is a term coined by Alan Watson that refers to the ‘moving of a 
rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one people to another’.1 
There is a rich body of literature documenting the evidence of legal transplants as the 
‘most fertile source of legal change in the world’.2  
2.1.1   Global Tax Convergence 
As an observable fact, tax law appears to be convergent at a global level in terms of 
the choice of taxes (income, property, sales or consumption), the underlying principles 
(fairness, efficiency and simplicity) and the levels of tax burdens.3  When faced with 
essentially the same tax problems, countries tend to adopt similar laws to solve these 
                                                 
1 A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1974), at 95. 
2 Ibid; O Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ in O Kahn-Freund, Selected Writings 
(Stevens Publishing, London, 1978).   
3 M Livingston, ‘Tax Culture, Tax History and the Limits of Convergence: A Comment on Professor Likhovski’s 
Article’ (2010) 11(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 18. 
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problems, which results in convergence. In the area of VAT, there is a remarkable 
degree of similarity in the over 100 countries that have adopted VAT.4  To a lesser 
degree, corporate income tax has recently enjoyed a greater degree of convergence, 
thanks to a greater mobility of capital and to globalisation.5  
Convergence in tax policy amongst members of the European Union and the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is perhaps the 
most comprehensive.6  Some tax rules and norms are virtually universal; for example, 
the arm’s length principle is found in virtually every one of 3000 or so bilateral tax 
treaties and the domestic law of most countries.7 The convergence of tax laws has 
reached such a stage that it is unthinkable for any country to adopt a new consumption 
tax that is vastly different from the VAT. It is equally unthinkable for any country to 
create an income tax system for the first time that deviates from the accepted 
international norms. Global tax issues, such as base erosion, profit shifting and 
stateless income tax planning (that is, moving income from the production and market 
countries to low-tax jurisdictions),8 are expected to lead to further convergence in tax 
laws governing the taxation of multinational corporations. 
                                                 
4 R Bird and P Gendron, The VAT in Developing and Transitional Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
K James, ‘An Examination of Convergence and Resistance in Global Tax Reform Trends’ (2010) 11 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 475. 
5 J Slemrod, Are Corporate Tax Rates, Or Countries Converging? (2001) 
<http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR//WP2001-12paper.pdf>; C Garbarino, ‘An Evolutionary and Structural 
Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research’ (2009) 57 ) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 677; R S Avi-Yonah, International Tax As International Law: An Analysis of the International 
Tax Regime (Cambridge Tax Law Series, Cambridge University Press, 2007); R S Avi-Yonah, N Sartori and O 
Marian, Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law (Oxford University Press, 2011); R S Avi-Yonah, ‘Tax 
Convergence and Globalization’ (July 8, 2010). U of Michigan Law & Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center 
Paper No. 10-019; U of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 214. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1636299. 
6 For further discussion, see F J Delgado and M J Preseno, Tax Policy Convergence in EU: An Empirical Analysis 
(2008) <http://www.ugr.es/~montero/XVIeep/93.pdf>; G Vintila, Fiscal Pressure and Tax Mix Convergence in the 
European Union (2012) <http://www.ibimapublishing.com/journals/JEERBE/2012/295339/295339.pdf>; Ken 
Messere, Flip de Kam and Christopher Heady, Tax Policy: Theory and Practice in OECD Countries (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), and V Tanzi, Tax Systems in the OECD: Recent Evolution, Competition and Convergence 
(2010) <http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp1012.pdf>. 
7 Avi-Yonah, above n 5; Garbarino, above n 5. 
8 H J Ault, ‘Some Reflections On the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles’ (2013) 70(12) Tax 
Notes International 1195, 1195–201; OECD Report For The G8 Summit, ‘A Step Change In Tax Transparency: 
Delivering a Standardised, Secure and Cost Effective Model of Bilateral Automatic Exchange for the Multilateral 
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2.2.2  Tax Transplants in China 
The modern evolution of Chinese law is largely a process of legal transplants in the 
name of modernisation.9 Chinese tax law is a clear example. Transplanting foreign tax 
laws into China is a recent phenomenon. China’s traditional tax system originated in 
2023 BC when the first state was created. It was home-grown until the Opium War in 
1842.10 Traditional taxes included land taxes and excises on salt, tea, liquor and other 
goods. After the Opium War, Western influences became a factor and China 
introduced toll charges (li jin 厘金), stamp duties and customs duties.11 Income tax 
was drafted by the Nationalist Government in 1928 but was never enacted.12 All of 
these taxes were abolished and replaced with a new system soon after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic.13 The function of taxation diminished when 
the socialist economic structure was entrenched and private ownership of property and 
entrepreneurship were limited. Taxation revived during the late 1970s, when China 
embarked on the path of economic reforms-and non-public actors were allowed to 
operate in the economy and some individuals were allowed to become rich first. The 
                                                                                                                                             
Context’ (June 2013) <http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-reports-to-g8-on-global-system-of-automatic-
exchange-of-tax-information.htm>; E D Kleinbard, ‘Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks’ Window into Stateless 
Income Tax Planning’, Center in Law, Economics and Organization, Research Papers Series No. C13-9; Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series No.13-10, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2264384; J G Gravelle, Tax Havens: 
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, CRS Report for Congress, (23 January 2013) <www.crs.gov>, R40623; 
and H Grubert and R Altshuler, ‘Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of 
International Tax’  (1 April 2013) <http://wwrn.com/abstract=2245128>.  
9 J. Chen, ‘Modernisation, Westernisation and Globalisation: Legal Transplant in China’ in J Oliveira and P 
Cardinal (eds), One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders: Perspectives of Evolution (Springer, 2009) 91. 
10 For an excellent account of the history of taxation in China and its relationship to culture, see Weng Lihua, 
Comprehensive Analysis of Chinese Fiscal and Tax Culture  (China Finance and Economics Press, 2nd ed, Beijing, 
2011) (in Chinese).   
11 Ibid at 68–9. 
12 Ibid at 70. 
13 The Administrative Council promulgated ‘Rules for the Implementation of National Tax Policies’ in January 
1950, which created a new tax system for China. For more discussion of the evolution of the Chinese tax system, 
see J Li, Taxation in the People’s Republic of China (1991) New York: Praeger. [Publisher and edition details if 
available] 
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notion of income tax was introduced in Article 8 of the 1979 Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Venture Law.14 
The first pieces of modern income tax legislation are the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint 
Venture Income Tax Law and the Individual Income Tax Law.15  These two tax laws 
include features found in income tax laws of other countries, but are not a carbon copy 
of any specific country’s law. The structure of the law and many key concepts reflect 
the so-called international tax norm. For example, tax liability is based on personal 
and territorial nexus with China, the tax base is net income, and foreign taxes are 
creditable.16 American tax scholars, such as Harvey Dale, Oliver Oldman, Stanley 
Surrey, Richard Pomp and Jerome Cohen, were among the early international experts 
who provided training to Chinese officials.17 Evidence of their teachings can be found 
in these two laws. The 1981 Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law18 has 19 articles and 
provides for Chinese source-based taxation of foreign enterprises. Subsequent income 
tax laws, especially the 2007 Enterprise Income Tax Law, 19  continue to include 
foreign tax principles, norms, concepts and rules. As such, the current income tax 
system in China is a hybrid of home-grown and transplanted laws.  
                                                 
14 It states: ‘From the gross profit earned by an equity joint venture, after payment of the venture's income tax in 
accordance with the provisions of the tax laws of the People's Republic of China …   and the net profit shall be 
distributed to the parties to the venture in proportion to their respective contributions to the registered capital’. 
15 The Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign 
Investment adopted by National People’s Congress and promulgated on 10 September 1980. The Income Tax Law 
applicable to Foreign Enterprises, adopted by the National People’s Congress in 1981. Both were abolished with 
the promulgation of Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment 
and Foreign Enterprises, promulgated by the National People’s Congress on 9 April 1991. For an overview of the 
history of the Chinese tax system, see A Easson and J Li, ‘Taxation of Foreign Business and Investment in the 
People’s Republic of China’ (1985–1986) New Jersey International Law & Business 666. 
16 Ibid Easson and Li.  
17 R D Pomp and S S Surrey, ‘The Structure of Taxation in the People’s Republic of China’ (1979) 20 Virginia J of 
Int’l L 1. 
18 The Law of People’s Republic of China on Foreign Enterprise Income Tax, promulgated on 8 December 1981 
by the 4th Session of the National People’s Congress.   
19 Enterprise Income Tax of the People’s Republic of China Art 58 (promulgated at the 5th session of the 10th 
National People’s Congress of China on 16 March 2007 and issued by Order of President No 63 on 16 March 2007) 
(the ‘EIT Law’); Implementation Regulations for the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, National Legislation IBFD was promulgated by State Council on 28 November 2007 and issued by the 
Order of the State Council No 512 on 6 December 2007 (the ‘EIT Regulations’). See J Li, ‘Fundamental Enterprise 
Income Tax Reform in China: Motivations and Major Changes’ (2007) 61 Bulletin for Intl Taxation 12; and J Li 
and H Huang, ‘Transformation of the Enterprise Income Tax: Internationalization and Chinese Innovations’ (2008) 
62 Bulletin for Intl Taxation 275. 
Business Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility and Taxation – Chinese Policy and Practice 
92 
 
The Chinese Value-added Tax (VAT) was also a transplant. It was first introduced in 
1980 to apply, on a trial basis, to companies manufacturing machinery, agricultural 
equipment and domestic appliances.20 VAT then expanded to apply to all domestic 
enterprises in 198421 and to foreign-investment enterprises and foreign enterprises in 
1994. 22  The scope of the VAT does not cover services (with the exception of 
processing, repair and maintenance), which are subject to a single-stage Business Tax. 
In 2011-2012, VAT was expanded to some services in selected pilot jurisdictions, such 
as Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing. 23  The VAT system is a transplant, with major 
modifications to suit China’s needs. One major modification is the denial of input 
credits for capital expenditures and another is the limitation of the tax base to goods.24 
Evidence of tax transplantation and tax convergence goes beyond formal laws. The 
interpretation of domestic laws by reference to international tax norms and best 
practices is often adopted. One example is the “Measures for the Implementation of 
Special Tax Adjustment (Trial)” issued by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) 
in 2009. This document reflects the international tax norms on transfer pricing.25 
China’s extensive tax treaty network also encourages the convergence of Chinese tax 
                                                 
20 Ministry of Finance, Notice on the Levy of VAT on a Trial Basis on Industrial Companies and Reform Industrial 
and Commercial Tax Collection Methods ( 11 July 1980). 
21 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on VAT (Draft), promulgated by the State Council on 18 
September 1984. 
22 Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Value-Added Tax, promulgated by State Council on 
13 December 1993. On 22 February 1994, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued The 
Decision to Subject Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises to VAT, Consumption Tax, Business 
Tax and other Taxes, effective on 1 January 1994. 
23 China Daily, ‘China Expands Value-added Tax Reform’, 2 October 2012 
<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-10/02/content_15795129.htm>. 
24 For further discussion of Chinese VAT, see Y Xu, ‘Putting the “Value Added” in China's VAT’ (2010) 58(6) 
Tax Notes International 487. 
25  State Administration of Taxation, (2009) Guo Shui Fa No 2, 8 January 2009, effective on 1 January 2008. 
Administrative circulars issued prior to 2008 were revoked. The SAT has issued several sets of measures related to 
transfer pricing, such as  ‘How to Deal With the Enterprise Income Tax on the Service Charges Paid to a Parent 
Company by a Subsidiary Company’ (2008) Guo Shui Fa No 86;  ‘Related Tax Policy Issues on the Pre-tax 
Deduction Standard of the Interest Expenses Paid to Related Parties’ (2008) Guo Shui Fa No121; ‘Trial Measures 
on the Application for Mutual Agreement Procedures (MAP) by Chinese Residents and Citizens’; SAT circular, 
(2005) Guo Shui Fa No 115. 
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laws with those of other countries.26  Such convergence is part of the trend of global 
tax convergence.  
2.2   Literature on legal transplants 
2.2.1   Theories on why legal transplants take place 
“The act of borrowing is usually simple. To build up a theory of borrowing on the 
other hand, seems to be an extremely complex matter”.27 Comparative law scholars 
have traditionally been more interested in observing the occurrence of legal transplants 
than in offering a theoretical explanation of why legal transplants happen.28 At the 
moment, the main theories are grounded in prestige, efficiency (or law and 
economics), law and development, and globalisation. 
According to the theory of prestige, foreign law enjoys certain prestige over domestic 
law, especially when the foreign country is perceived as more advanced. 29  The 
prestige theory is related to the theory of formants, which focuses on law as a social 
activity and argues that legal process is seen as a competitive arena with different 
groups of elites (or formants), such as lawmakers, judges, lawyers, and legal scholars, 
including foreign advisors.30 The incentives for these actors in legal transplantation are 
                                                 
26 See J Li, “The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates’ 8 
Florida Tax Rev 670 (also available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087382); [LINK 
TITLE DOES NOT MATCH] and W Cui, ‘The China-United Kingdom Tax Treaty’ (2013) 67(6) Bulletin for 
Internationall Taxation 271.  
27 A Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception of Law’ (1996) 44(2) American Journal of Comparative Law 335, at 335.  See 
also A Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (2000) 4.4 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 
<http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html>. 
28  U Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems’ (1997) 45(1) 
American Journal of Comparative Law 5; J Smits, ‘The Harmonization of Private Law in Europe: Some Insights 
from Evolutionary Theory’ (2002) 31 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 79; E Örücü, ‘A 
Theoretical Framework for Trans-Frontier Mobility of Law’ in R Jagtenberg, E Örücü and A J  De Roo (eds), 
Transfrontier Mobility of Law (Kluwer Law International, 1995) 14.  
29 R Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ (1991) 39(1) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 343; A Gianmaria, ‘By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe’ 
(1995) 43(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 93. 
30 Ibid Sacco; H Spamann, ‘Contemporary Legal Transplants — Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) 
Law’ (2009) Brigham Young University Law Review 1813; J Ohnesorge, ‘Beijing Consensus Anyone?’ 
(Symposium: The Future of Law and Development, Part V) (2010) 104 Northwestern University Law Review 
Colloquy 257; D M Trubek and A Santos, The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (2006). 
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significant factors in determining what to transplant and how well the transplants 
work.31 Judges and lawyers play a unique role in transplanting foreign laws.32 
The efficiency theory is advocated by some comparative law and economics 
scholars.33 It suggests that economic efficiency is the main reason for legal transplants. 
If a doctrine enjoys a wide success in the competitive arena of international legal 
thinking and practice, it means that this doctrine is more efficient than its alternatives. 
Borrowing legal rules may also reduce the cost of developing indigenous rules. Where 
ideological concerns are less strong, efficient convergences are more likely to occur. 
Laws that regulate economic transactions in one country can be more readily 
transplanted to another country.34   
The law and development movement includes transplanting the Western rule of law, 
institutions and legal doctrines to less developed countries.35 The Western legal system 
is advocated by local policy makers as enhancing economic development. The logic 
seems quite straightforward: Western economies are more developed and such 
development is predicated on the legal system. International institutions, such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have tied financial assistance 
packages to countries with legal reforms. 
                                                 
31 F Schauer, ‘The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation’ in Joseph S Nye (ed), Governance In A 
Globalizing World (Brookings Institution Press, 2000). 
32 N Garoupa and A Ogus, ‘A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants’ (2006) 35(2) Journal of Legal Studies 
339. 
33  W Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (1): What Was It Like to Try A Rat?’ (1995) 143 Penn L Rev 1889; 
Mattei, above n 28; A Ogus, ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic 
Analysis to Comparative Law’ (1999) 48 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 405. 
34 E Buscagalia and W E Ratliff, Law and Economics in Developing Countries (2000). 
35  See, for example, D Berkowitz, K Pistor and J F Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51(1) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 163;  A Gelpern, Law & Development Narrow and Law & Development Broad, In 
Symposium: The Future of Law and Development, Part I (2009) 104 Northwestern University Law Review 
Colloquy 164;  F Schauer, ‘The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation’ (2000) Working Papers at Centre 
of International Development at Harvard University, 
<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers- 
programs/centers/cid/publications/faculty/wp/044.pdf>; R Peerenboom, ‘What Have We Learned About Law and 
Development? Describing, Predicting and Assessing Legal Reforms in China’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 823.  
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In the age of globalisation, competitive pressures force many less developed countries 
to harmonise their legal systems with those of capital-exporting countries by 
incorporating foreign legal frameworks that firms in advanced economies think will 
enhance their security and productive efficiency. Even among developed countries, 
there is a growing ‘Americanization’ of laws in the European Union and amongst 
members of the OECD.36  Yet, the transplantation of American laws has not led to a 
complete harmonisation due to well-entrenched social and political differences among 
countries.37  
All of the above theories seem to help explain the phenomenon of legal transplantation 
to China. China rationalises the borrowing of Western laws governing economic 
transactions on the ground that they are rational and advanced.38 China’s desire to 
attract foreign direct investment during the early years of its economic reform made it 
imperative for China to adopt laws that appear similar to foreign investors, including 
tax laws, corporate and commercial laws, and intellectual property laws. China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organisation also deepens the transplantation process. 
China borrowed Western laws even in areas of public law, such as criminal 
procedures.  
2.2.2   Determinants of Successful Legal Transplants 
There is little agreement among scholars on what makes a transplant work and how to 
measure success.39  However, literature suggests that, in general, whether or not a 
transplant can adapt and survive depends on both internal and external factors. Internal 
                                                 
36  L A Mistelis, ‘Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, Legal Transplants, and Law Reform — Some 
Fundamental Observations’ (2000) 34 International Lawyer 1055. 
37 R A Kagan, ‘Globalization and Legal Change: The “Americanization” of European Law?’  (2007) 1 Regulation 
& Governance 99; J Mertus and E Breier-Sharlow, ‘Power, Legal Transplants and Harmonization’ (2003–4) 
University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 81; T C Halliday and P Osinsky, ‘Globalization of Law’ (2006) 32 
Annual Review of Sociology 447–70. 
38 J F Chen, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) 70. 
39 H Kanda and C Milhaupt, ‘Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese 
Corporate Law’ (2003) 51(4) American Journal of Comparative Law 887. 
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factors would be the quality of the rule itself (in organisms these would be the genes or 
the DNA). External factors include local legal culture, social norm, political conditions 
and economic conditions, which is collectively referred to as environmental factors.40  
A legal system or rule has a greater chance of success in transplantation if it is of good 
quality. Quality can be measured by factors such as: whether it is regarded as ‘good’ in 
the home jurisdiction, whether it has been transplanted into a different country and 
taken root in that country, whether it has been codified into an international treaty, 
whether it is controversial at home or abroad, and whether it is based on a sound 
theory. For example, the system of rule of law has been tested in Western democracies 
and embraced by many developing countries, and its genetic quality is arguably good.  
The type of transplants also matters. Some laws and rules are more ‘mechanical’ or 
‘technical’ and thus are easier to transplant. Examples include laws regulating 
economic relations and market transactions. The ‘invisible hand’ that regulates market 
behaviour is arguably ‘global’. On the other hand, some laws and rules are more 
‘personal’ or ‘social’ and are therefore more sensitive to the social environment. 
Examples include laws regulating social relationships and the relationships between 
the state and its citizens (such as constitutional law, criminal law, and family law). As 
such, public law is harder to transplant than private law. For example, Kahn-Freund 
distinguishes between various ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ transplants and argues that 
transplants of the ‘organic’ type depend mainly on their interlocking with specific 
power structures of the societies involved.41 
The relevance of environmental factors, such as social, legal and political culture and 
economic conditions, to the success of legal transplants is controversial. One school of 
                                                 
40 J L Nolan, Legal Accents, Legal Borrowing: The International Problem-Solving Court Movement (2009); G 
Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences’ in P A Hall and D Soskice (eds), 
Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
41 Kahn-Freund, above n 2, 303. 
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thought maintains that the process of legal transplantation is indicative of the 
autonomy of law. The representative of this school is Alan Watson, the ‘father’ of 
legal transplants. Laws are instruments to solving common problems in different 
societies. Legal evolution takes place rather insulated from social changes. The 
success of legal transplants can be explained by a highly developed autonomy of the 
modern legal profession. 42  The recent export of Western laws and institutions to 
developing and transition countries seems to be influenced by this thinking. 
Another school of thought argues that law is embedded in society and that legal 
institutions and norms transferred from one system to another can only survive if there 
is a fit between the two systems and the environment of the borrowing country. This is 
the culturalists’ position which is also consistent with the evolutionary theory of law 
that sees adaptation of a rule to the local culture as critical for its survival because ‘law 
is deeply ensconced in a particular cultural context’.43  The culturalists maintain that a 
legal transplant is like a kidney transplant.44 The key question to ask is: ‘Can it be 
adjusted to the new body or will the new body reject it?’  The culturalists recognise 
that while legal rules have their inherent ‘logic’, they are also inextricably tied to 
culture.45  Teubner also asserts that the dialectical nature of the relationship between 
the transplant and local culture is a process of ‘co-evolution’: “Legal irritants” cannot 
be domesticated; they are not transformed from something alien into something 
familiar, not adapted to a new cultural context, rather they will unleash an 
evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and 
the internal context will undergo fundamental change.’46   
                                                 
42  A Watson, ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants’ (1995) 43(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 
469. 
43  Nolan, above n 40, 28. 
44 Kahn-Freund, above n 2. 
45 Nolan, above n 40; Teubner, above n 40. 
46 Teubner, above n 40, 12. F A Hayek, ‘Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of Conduct’ in F A Hayek 
(ed), Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (Routledge, 1967) 66. 
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Others maintain that ‘[b]ecause law is a product and a carrier of culture, when it 
moves from one place to another, it not only functions differently in the importing 
country (i.e. adapts), but it will skew the receiving culture in profound ways.’47 They 
further argue that because law is deeply embedded in culture, legal transplants are 
exposed to the insurmountable differences of cultural organisms; they cannot survive 
the surgical operation. Legal transplants are thus literally ‘meaningless’ because ‘as it 
crosses boundaries, the original rule necessarily undergoes a change that affects it qua 
rule.’48   
2.3   Emerging Literature on Tax Transplants 
2.3.1 ‘Touchy’ issues about tax law  
During the past two decades or so, the body of literature on comparative tax law has 
been growing.49 However, because of language barriers and the complexity of tax 
laws, comparative tax law research is ‘torturous’50 and has a minoritarian position in 
the global tax discourse.51 The transplantation of tax laws is a ‘touchy’ issue.52  
                                                 
47 Nolan, above n 40, citing Jack Hiller, 439. 
48 P Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European Comparative 
Law 111; P Legrand, ‘The Return of the Repressed: Moving Comparative Legal Studies Beyond Pleasure’ (2001) 
75 Tulane Law Review 1033;  P Legrand, ‘What ‘Legal Transplants’?’ in D Nelken and J Feest (eds), Adapting 
Legal Cultures (Hart, 2001);  P Legrand, ‘The Same and the Different’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 240 and P Legrand,  
‘Paradoxically, Derrida: For a Comparative Legal Studies’ (2005) 27 Cardozo Law Review 631. 
49 D Ring, ‘The Promise of International Tax Scholarship and Its Implications for Research Design, Theory and 
Methodology’ (2010) 55(1) St Louis University Law Journal 307; O Marian, ‘The Discursive Failure in 
Comparative Tax Law’ (2010) 58(2) American Journal of Comparative Law 415; Avi-Yonah et al, above 
n5[above n 5??], H Ault & B J Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis (Kluwer Law 
International, 3rd ed, 2010); V Thuronyi, ‘What Can We Learn from Comparative Tax Law?’ (2004) 103 Tax 
Notes 459; M A Livingston, ‘Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and Limits of Comparative Tax’ 
(2005) 18(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 119; M A Livingston, ‘From Milan to Mubai, Changing 
in Tel Aviv: Reflections on Progressive Taxation and “Progressive” Politics in a Globalized but Still Local World’ 
(2006) 54(3) American Journal of Comparative Law 555; M A Livingston, ‘From Mumbai to Shanghai, with a 
Side Trip to Washington: China, India, and the Future of Progressive Taxation in an Asian-Led World’ (2010) 
11(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 539; and Livingston, above n 3. 
50 Ibid Ault and Arnold. 
51 Marian, above n 49; Avi-Yonah et al, above n 5. [Does this also refer to n 5?] 
52 Livingston, above n 3.   
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Transplanting ‘universal tax norms’ such as the arm’s length principle, appears easy. 
International institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, have ‘transplanted’ 
Western tax laws and norms to developing and transition countries.53 OECD member 
countries have been borrowing tax laws from each other in reforming their domestic 
tax laws, especially those related to corporations and international transactions. 54  
Transplanting progressive income tax either by imposition (as in the case of 
colonisation) or by voluntary borrowing reflects the belief that it is a ‘good’ tax. 
However, the problem lies in implementation. For example, Likhovski demonstrates 
that the law on the books, which was transplanted from Britain to Mandatory 
Palestine, did not differ much from that in other British dominions, but the law in 
action did because of local cultural and institutional factors.55 Infanti argues that the 
risk of the rejection of tax transplant is multiplied if the tax rules are being ‘cloned’.56 
If local conditions are ignored, the transplants may cause harm to the receiving 
country.57 On the other hand, since the level of taxation reflects social and democratic 
values, it is suggested that tax transplants can promote democratic policy and human 
development.58    
Comparative tax scholarship is primarily descriptive and doctrinal, aimed at advancing 
the understanding of alternative solutions to common problems and providing practical 
guidelines to policy makers and their international tax advisors. 59  This type of 
scholarship is considered important because of the special features of tax law, such as 
the inherently global nature of this field, the complexity of tax laws, the importance of 
                                                 
53 Thuronyi, above n 49; M Stewart, ‘Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: Mapping Tax Reform in Developing and 
Transition Countries’ (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 140. 
54 Ault and Arnold, above n 49; Garbarino, above n 5.  
55 A Likhovski, ‘Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of Income Tax Law in Mandatory 
Palestine’ (2010) 11(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 725. 
56 A C Infanti, ‘Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a Comparative Approach to Reforming the US 
International Tax Regime’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1105; A C Infanti , ‘The Ethics of 
Tax Cloning’ (2003) 6(3) Florida Tax Review 251. 
57 Stewart, above n 53. 
58 W B Barker, ‘Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of the 
Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (2005) 109(3) Penn State Law Review 703. 
59 Ault and Arnold, above n 49; Thuronyi, above n 49. 
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detailed knowledge of both the international tax systems and the likely planning 
techniques, and the influence of norms and ‘soft law’. 60  There is a premium on 
developing an understanding of the complex ways in which tax policies form on a 
global scale — how norms are established and how countries influence each other’s 
policy choices. 61  
In terms of general characteristics, tax laws are in the nature of public law with 
profound social and economic implications for the private sector. Among the types of 
taxes, some are more value-based and organic, while others tend to be more 
‘technical’. For example, personal income tax expresses the societal sense of 
distributive justice and fairness, and is thus deeply rooted in the social, economic and 
political environment. VAT tends to be more ‘technical’ and is used to maximise 
revenue while minimising tax distortions. Its dependence on the environment is mostly 
in the area of administration and compliance. Corporate income tax is most vulnerable 
to global influences due to the mobility of capital and the pressures of international tax 
competition, and thus it is more susceptible to transplantation. A common feature of 
all tax laws, however, is their complexity and high level of technicality. As such, 
expertise is required in drafting, implementing and complying with tax laws. 
2.3.2 Common Core  
The general debates about the autonomy of law (hence legal transplantation) and the 
relevance of culture (adaptation and modification of transplants) extend to the 
transplantation of tax laws. Evidence on Chinese tax transplant is abundant in 
supporting both schools. Chinese tax transplantation occurs at different levels of the 
hierarchy of taxation. Starting from the top is the mix of taxes, tax policies, tax 
                                                 
60M Livingston, ‘Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy’ (1998) 
266, Cornell Law Review 83[There aren’t any 1998 Livingston publications at 49?]; A Christians, ‘Critical Issues 
in Comparative & International Taxation: Case Study Research and International Tax Theory’ (2010) 55(1) St 
Louis University Law Journal 331; D Ring, above n 49.  
61 Avi-Yonah, 2007, above n 5. 
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structures, tax concepts, and tax rules. The higher level a transplant is in the hierarchy, 
the more autonomous the law is because it reflects the ‘common core’62 of modern 
taxation. Another way of looking at the common core is from the perspectives of the 
functions of taxation and the design of tax laws. The need for taxation as a revenue 
source and as a policy instrument is common, and hence tax laws perform the same 
functions in different countries. The tax design features that address common 
problems are generally adopted by many jurisdictions.  
During the past three decades, the Chinese tax system has evolved from a primarily 
turnover tax system to a system of mixed income taxes and VAT/turnover taxes. The 
types of taxes that China could introduce to facilitate the transition from a centrally-
planned economy to a market-based economy were limited to those commonly used in 
other countries. Taxation was regarded as a field of ‘science’.63 As such, the scientific 
theories and proofs developed in other countries were applicable to China. For 
example, income taxes which were non-existent until 1980 have become increasingly 
important in China in generating revenue. Income tax revenue accounted for 15 per 
cent of total tax revenue in 1994 and 24 per cent in 2010.64 As discussed below, 
however, the design and implementation of income taxes and VAT in China differ 
significantly from the ‘common core’ of these taxes in OECD countries. 
From the design perspective, some general principles or ideas of taxation are common. 
One example is the principle of progressive taxation. The Chinese Individual Income 
Tax has progressive rates for employment income and business income. 65  Other 
examples include the principle of deferring to financial accounting in determining 
corporate income and the principle of recognising the legal form of transactions.  
                                                 
62 The notion of ‘common core’ of tax rules is used in Avi-Yonah, Sartori and Marian, above n 49, at 6–7; Ault 
and Arnold, above n 49. 
63 See, for example, Jin Xin, Collection of Papers by Jin Xin (China Tax Press, 2008) (in Chinese). 
64  See tax revenue statistics on the SAT website at www.chinatax.gov.cn; Gongliang Tang (ed), Annual China Tax 
Report- Forecasting China Tax Reform in the 12th Five-Year Plan Period  (2011) 17 (in Chinese).  
65 For a study of the Chinese Individual Income Tax and its comparison with personal income tax in other 
countries, see L Liu, Progressivity of Income Tax and Income Redistribution ( 2011) (in Chinese). 
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The basic structural design of Chinese income taxes and VAT is consistent with the 
common core by including: who is taxable, what is taxable, how much is taxable, 
when is tax payable, and how are taxes paid and disputes resolved. The basic structure 
of international taxation includes the taxation of residents — with respect to their 
foreign-source income, the taxation of non-residents in relation to their domestic 
income and rules to protect the integrity of these two elements (i.e., anti-avoidance 
rules). The structure of a tax is perhaps the most scientific or mechanical element of 
any tax law. 
The basic concepts in Chinese income tax laws and VAT law also share some 
commonality with those in Western countries.  For example, income from 
employment, which accounts for the biggest portion of the tax base for personal 
income tax, is taxable, generally on a gross basis, and is subject to withholding at 
source.66 A corporation is taxed as a separate person and special rules of consolidation 
are needed to overrule this fundamental principle.67 ‘Residence’ determines the scope 
of a person’s tax liability in a jurisdiction. ‘Place of consumption’ and ‘export tax 
refund’ mean that VAT is levied on consumers not producers. 
Specific tax rules tend to be more divergent, depending on local environment, 
including drafting conventions and tax culture.  However, a common core is still 
discernible in some areas. For example, the transfer pricing rule in China looks similar 
to that in other countries. The transplantation of the tax common core does not mean 
that the transplanted tax, policy, principle, concept or rule remain unchanged in China. 
Even if the transplants remain unchanged in form, they inevitably acquire some 
‘Chinese characteristics’ in reality.   
                                                 
66 Ault and Arnold, above n 49. 
67 Ibid;  G Cooper, ‘Policy Forum: A Few Observations on Managing the Taxation of Corporate Groups – The 
Australian Experience’ (2011) 59(2) Canadian Tax Journal 265; A Ting, “The Unthinkable Policy Option? Key 
Design Issues Under A System of Full Consolidation” (2011) 59(3) Canadian Tax Journal 421. 




Tax ideas or rules are generally more difficult to transfer if they are embedded in local 
socio-economic culture. In general, rules affecting individuals and governing domestic 
transactions are more culture-specific than those affecting capital and corporations and 
governing international transactions respectively. The transplantation of the tax 
‘common core’ does not mean complete tax convergence because the convergence of 
tax laws does not necessarily lead to convergence in the institutions or processes for 
tax law in general. This means that transplanted tax laws are formulated and 
administered by institutions through processes that are as divergent as before. There is 
also little evidence on the convergence of tax culture or tax environment.68 As such, 
the gap between tax laws on the book and tax laws in action is, presumably, quite 
significant in different countries. The progressivity of income tax will be used as an 
example.  
Progressive income taxation was first introduced in Prussia (Germany) in the late 19th 
century, which lead to a rise in tax rate from 0.67 to 4 per cent. Though some other 
Continental countries soon followed Prussia, it took nearly twenty years for the 
movement to reach the Anglo-Saxon powers.  In 1910 and 1913, Great Britain and the 
United States adopted graduated income taxes rising to 8.25 and 7 per cent, 
respectively.  During World War I and the post-war years, the top rate subsequently 
reached 97 and 91 per cent. Other Western democracies and developing countries 
followed suit. 69  Even though the recent adoption of ‘flat tax’ in some Eastern 
European countries70 erodes the idea of progressivity as a universal idea, progressive 
                                                 
68 Livingston, above n 3. 
69 For an excellent discussion of the history of the debate about equity and efficiency and the idea of progressive 
taxation, see D J Ventry Jr, ‘Equity Versus Efficiency and the U S Tax System in Historical Perspective’ in J J 
Thorndike and D J Ventry, Jr (eds), Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate (2002) 25; and W J Blum and H Kalven Jr, 
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (1963).  For a discussion about progressive taxation and democracy, 
see S Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern 
State (Yale University Press, 1996 ).   
70 Examples are Russia, Romania and the Czech Republic. 
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taxation remains a powerful symbol of a society’s notion of fairness, equity and tax 
justice. High-income countries and low-income countries tend to have similar top 
marginal personal income tax rates.71 
The superficial level of global convergence on progressive taxation cannot be 
confused with the great variations in the practice of progressive taxation across 
countries. Personal income tax accounts for about 25 per cent of total tax revenue in 
OECD countries (and higher ratio in the United States and Common-law countries) 
and less than 10 per cent in low-income countries. In China, the ratio is about 6 
percent, meaning that progressive taxation has a greater impact on tax fairness and 
justice in higher-income countries than in lower-income countries.72 The variation is 
attributable to differences in political factors, economic factors, societal attitudes, 
institutional factors, and effectiveness in tax administration.  
Research finds that political will is the ‘sine qua non of any successful tax reform’ and 
a country’s tax system, especially, personal income tax system, reflects its political 
institutions.73  ‘The main reason many developing countries do not tax themselves 
more may be that increasing tax is not in the interest of those who dominate the 
political institutions of such countries’.74 In Latin America, for example, the difficulty 
in implementing progressive taxation is due to a lack of ‘an (implicit) social contract 
between governments and the general populace of the kind that is embedded in 
taxation and fiscal principles and practices in politically more stable parts of the 
world’.75 In the United States, on the other hand, there is a political process for finding 
                                                 
71 See K Sabirrianova and S Buttrick, ‘Global Reform of Personal Income Taxation: 1981–2005: Evidence from 
189 Countries’ (2010) 63 National Tax Journal 447. 
72 R Bird and E Zolt, “Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing 
Countries” (2005) 52(6) UCLA Law Review 1. 
73 R Bird, ‘Managing Tax Reform’ (2004) 58 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 42.  
74 R Bird, J Martinez-Vazque and B Torgler, ‘Tax Efforts in Developing Countries and High Income Countries: 
The Impact of Corruption, Voice and Accountability’ (2008) 38 Economic Analysis & Policy 55. 
75 V A Schneider and M Moore, Pro-Poor Tax Reform in Latin America: A Critical Survey and Policy 
Recommendations, IDS, Sussex, (March 2003). 
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the right balance between competing demands of social equity, economic incentives 
and the need to pay for an expanding government.76  
The level of economic development tends to coincide with the actual level of 
progressive taxation. The tax system in OECD countries is more progressive than that 
in lower-income countries. In the latter, because per capita income is low, the number 
of taxpayers is also low. The existence of a large informal sector in developing 
countries makes it difficult to observe and assess personal income tax.77 Moreover, 
corruption has a larger negative impact on income taxes compared with consumption 
taxes,78 and corruption-resistant features are often missing in the design of taxes in 
developing countries.79 
‘Tax administration matters – a lot!’80 The best tax policy on paper means nothing if it 
cannot be effectively administered. A large body of literature has examined tax 
administration difficulties — faced by developing countries. The main challenges 
include the size of the agricultural and informal sector, the use of the financial sector 
(in relation to the economic environment in which tax administrators operate), the 
organisational change and the political will to reduce corruption, rent seeking and 
improvement in the accountability of tax administration, and the use of technology in 
tax administration.81 
Local culture also plays a role in the divergence of progressivity.  Livingston 
demonstrates that institutional and attitudinal differences in China, India, Israel, Italy 
                                                 
76 S R Weisman, The Great Tax Wars (Simon and Schuster, 2002). 
77 S Mahdavi, ‘The Level and Composition of Tax Revenue in Developing Countries: Evidence from Unbalanced 
Panel Data’ (2008) 17 International Review of Economics and Finance 607. 
78 V Tanzi and H R Davoodi, ‘Corruption, Growth, and Public Finance’ (IMF Working Paper WP/00/182, 2000). 
79 M Emran, and Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Development Oriented Tax Policy’ (Columbia University and GWU Working 
Papers, 2006). 
80 R Bird, ‘Taxation and Development’ (2010) The World Bank < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPREMNET/Resources/EP34.pdf >, no 34,  4. [Kindly note the link doesn’t 
work]. 
81 See Bird, above n 73; J Alm, J Martínez–Vazquez and S Wallace (eds), Taxing the Hard–to–Tax: Lessons from 
Theory and Practice (Elsevier Science Ltd, 2005). 
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and the United States have some effect on progressive taxation, even though the 
precise effect is difficult to discern.82 He also notes that attitudinal differences (tax 
anthropology) are less important than institutional factors (tax sociology). Steinmo 
found that the different models of democratic culture in the United States, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom helped explain the different level of progressivity in these 
countries.83 
3. Tax Processes 
The existing literature does not specifically address the relevance of process to legal or 
tax transplants.84 This part of the paper discusses why processes are important and 
what the major differences are in tax processes between China and Canada (which is 
used as a representative of Western countries). 
3.1   Importance of Tax Processes in Tax Transplants  
Processes are important in studying tax transplants for several reasons. First, taxation 
is more of a science than an art. Second, taxation is about sharing and thus how to 
share is often as important as what is shared. Third, the desired effect of tax 
transplants is ‘practical’ and ‘real’ in the sense of generating revenue with minimal 
adverse impact on market efficiency and private choices, which means that the law in 
action is generally more relevant than the law on paper. 
‘Taxation is a field of science’.85 Science is both a body of knowledge and process. 
Science is ongoing, continually refining and expanding our knowledge. Scientific 
processes lead to new questions for future investigation. Science is a global human 
                                                 
82 Livingston, above n 3; Livingston (2006), above n 49.   
83 Steinmo, above n 69. 
84 For example, G Mousourakis, ‘Transplanting Legal Models Across Culturally Diverse Societies: A Comparative 
Law Perspective’ (2010) 57 Osaka University Law Review 87.   
85 Jin, above n 63. 
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endeavour. Taxation science can be learned and tax knowledge can be shared. 
Because of the necessity of raising money by taxes, the ‘most perfect knowledge of 
the science is required’.86 How to raise the desired amount of taxes with minimal 
interference is one of the key scientific questions for tax researchers and 
policymakers. Experiences in one country can be learned by another country. The 
phenomenon of tax transplants illustrates the scientific aspect of taxation. Both the 
knowledge of taxation and the process of taxation can be learned, refined and 
expanded, and used to solve problems in different countries. The learning and 
borrowing of knowledge itself is never complete. Without scientific processes,  
knowledge may not be useful or be improved. As explained above, however, 
processes are embedded in culture. Incorporating scientific taxation processes into the 
local culture requires scientific transplantation processes, such as the process of 
selection, the process of translation, and the process of adaptation. More importantly, 
the transplantation of substantive tax rules or laws without transplanting the relevant 
tax processes will likely impede the chance of successful adaptation of the transplants.  
Taxation is not just about raising the desired amount of money. It is also an act of 
laying a tax, i.e. the process by which the state, through its law–making body, raises 
revenue to defray the necessary expenses of the government. Much of the debate about 
taxation and tax policy surrounds the ‘how’ question, rather than the ‘how much’ 
question. Because the process of taxation is superimposed on the economic process (or 
market allocation of resources) and interacts with social relationships, its impact on 
the society is immense. That is why the standard policy criteria for assessing taxation 
are equity and fairness, neutrality and efficiency in administration. The equity and 
                                                 
86 ‘If it were not for the necessity of taxation’, wrote Richardo in 1819, ‘the business of government regarding 
Agriculture, Commerce and Manufactures would be very easy indeed, --- all that would be required of them would 
be to avoid all interference, neither to encourage one source of production nor to depress another, but the necessity 
of raising money by taxes renders some interference necessary. The aim of the legislature should nevertheless be 
to press on all equally, so as to interfere as little as possible with the natural equilibrium which would have 
prevailed if no disturbance whatever had been given’. See C S Shoup, Ricardo and Taxation (FinanzArchiv / 
Public Finance Analysis, New Series, Bd. 18, H. 1 (1957/58), 13–24 . 
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fairness criterion evaluates the spread of the tax burden among taxpayers. The 
neutrality criterion looks at the interaction between taxation and the market. The 
administrative efficiency criterion looks at the overall cost and efficiency of tax 
compliance and administration.87  
Taxation is about the political process of a country. There can be different models for 
making political decisions. Irrespective of the model, taxpayers are key players in the 
process. They can vote with their hand (election), their feet (emigration) or their arms 
(rebellion). They can ‘voluntarily’ comply with tax laws or resist taxation through 
lawful or unlawful means. The doctrine of no taxation without representation is 
embraced in the United States and other Western democracies. At the end of the day, 
taxation is not just about the end, but also the means. Taxation is the process of 
maintaining public trust in government. Because taxation affects almost every citizen 
as either taxpayers or as beneficiaries of public programs financed by tax revenue, the 
manner in which the government administers tax laws and deals with the public 
significantly affect public opinion about the government. In the absence of public 
trust, it is difficult, if possible at all, to operate a modern tax system.  
The general objective of taxation is to raise revenue. The primary goal of tax 
transplants is to borrow foreign laws and incorporate them into the local system so that 
the system is more efficient in raising revenue while meeting other policy objectives. 
Ideally, the gap between the ‘law on paper’ and the ‘law in action’ should be as small 
as possible. The size of the gap, to a great extent, depends upon the similarity of the 
processes of making, interpreting and enforcing the laws. Owing to social, political 
                                                 
87 It might be interesting to note that in spite of the significant reductions in tax rates during the past four decades, 
the average tax burden measured by the tax/GDP ratio has changed in the opposite direction! According to the 
OECD report, Tax Reform Trends in OECD Countries (2011) <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/48193734.pdf>, in the 
mid 1980s, the top personal income tax rate in OECD countries exceeded 65 per cent, and corporate income tax 
rate was rarely less than 45 per cent; in 2011, these rates were dropped to 41.5 per cent and 26 per cent 
respectively. Meanwhile, the average tax/GDP ratio actually increased from 30.5 per cent to 35 per cent. One 
might ask: whose tax burden was increased or decreased? How? Why? What processes led to such outcome?  
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and economic reasons, such processes are often different between countries, especially 
countries belonging to different legal families. The types of taxes and the level of 
taxation generally reflect the outcomes of the social choices or political decisions of a 
country. As such, tax processes are expected to be more divergent than tax policies or 
tax rules across countries. That presents challenges to successful tax transplants. The 
level of sensitivity of tax transplants to local culture and local processes may depend 
on the type of tax transplants. As mentioned earlier, VAT is arguably less sensitive 
than income taxes; corporate income tax is less sensitive than personal income tax; 
international tax rules are less sensitive than domestic tax rules; tax rules related to 
market transactions are less sensitive than those related to personal or social 
transactions; administrative tax rules are less sensitive than judicial procedures; 
policy-based rules (such as tax incentives and anti-avoidance rules) are less sensitive 
than basic charging rules. In terms of tax policy, equity-and fairness-oriented policies 
are more sensitive to local culture than efficiency-and growth-oriented policies. 
Cultural orientation towards fairness and equity is more evident in tax policy whereas 
efficiency and economic growth are influenced more by market forces and 
globalisation.  
3.2 Differences between China and the West  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the differences in the Western way of 
thinking and the Chinese way of thinking about processes. It suffices to note below 
some differences that may be relevant in thinking about taxation and tax transplants. 
Canada is used as an example of the West in the following discussions, but it is 
important to note that there are significant differences among Western countries. 
3.2.1 Less Emphasis on Processes in China 
Generally speaking, the Chinese way of thinking emphasises less on processes and 
more on results. There can be several explanations for this.  
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First, Chinese tend to think holistically, whereas Westerners tend to think analytically. 
Researchers find that ‘East Asians tend to be holistic, attending to the entire field and 
assigning causality to it, making relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and 
relying on “dialectical” reasoning, whereas Westerners are more analytic, paying 
attention primarily to the object and the categories to which it belongs and using rules, 
including formal logic, to understand its behaviour’.88  
Second, Chinese tend to adopt a compromise approach in dealing with seeming 
contradictions — retaining basic elements of opposing perspectives by seeking a 
‘middle way’, whereas Westerners tend to follow a differentiation model that polarises 
contradictory perspectives in an effort to determine which fact or position is correct. 
Chinese prefer dialectical resolutions to social conflicts 89  and favour dialectical 
arguments over classical Western logical argumentation.90  Westerners are keen on 
finding out who is right in an argument. On the other hand, it has been argued that the 
tendency to find the middle way has hampered Chinese’s efforts to seek out scientific 
truth through aggressive argumentation, the classic Western method for forging a 
linear path through contradictory information, which results in identifying right and 
wrong answers.91 
Third, Chinese culture values collective interest, hierarchy and social harmony, 
whereas Western culture values individualism, recognises self-interest, and develops a 
common core through processes. Rules and processes are presumably more important 
                                                 
88 R E Nisbett, I Choi, K Peng and A Norenzayan, ‘Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic 
Cognition’ (2001) 108 Psychological Review 291, 291. 
89 The Chinese apply dialectical thinking to social relationships, not to the physical material world or science. For 
example, the Chinese do not apply dialectical thinking to astronomy and geography to come to the conclusion that 
the sun can rise in both the East and the West.  [Can you kindly clarify?] 
90 K Peng and R Nisbett, ‘Culture, Dialectcs, and Reasoning about Contradiction’ <http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~nisbett/cultdialectics.pdf>.   
91 K Peng was quoted in ‘Americans and Chinese have Different Ways of Discovering Truth, Finds UC Berkeley 
Expert on Chinese Psychology’ <http://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/98legacy/06_09_1998.html>.  For 
further discussion, see K Peng, J Spencer-Rodgers and N Zhong, ‘Naive Dialecticism and the Tao of Chinese 
Thought’ in U Kim, K S Yang and G Huang (eds), The Handbook of Indigenous and Cultural Psychology (2005), 
247–62; F E Blackwell, J Hagaman, J Grice and K Peng, From Leadership to Parenthood: The Applicability of 
Leadership Styles to Parenting Styles. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice (2006), 43-56. 
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in balancing competing interests among ‘equals’ than prescribing duties and 
obligations of the ‘subordinates’. In any society, people are both individual beings and 
social beings and most people look after their self-interest. In the West, individual 
rights and private property are recognised and respected and relationships (private-
private and private-public) are regulated through law. The Chinese thinking is 
primarily top-down, whereas the Western thinking is more bottom-up, starting from 
the basic unit.  
3.2.2 Approach to Problem Solving 
Approaches to solving problems are different in the Chinese culture and Western 
culture. The Chinese approach tends to be more pragmatic, result-oriented, experts-
led, and non-confrontational, whereas the Western approach tends to be more 
principled, process-driven, evidence-based, and encourages open debates. At the risk 
of oversimplification, the Chinese approach is represented by the two famous sayings: 
‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’, and ‘A cat is a good cat no matter it is white 
or black’. In the West, a problem solving process typically consists of defining the 
problem, analysing the problem, generating possible solutions, analysing the solutions, 
selecting the best solution(s) and reassessing the solutions. The different approaches to 
problem-solving can be illustrated by the approach to tax reforms in Canada and in 
China. 
One of the most thorough reform processes in Canada occurred in the 1960s. The 
problems to be addressed by the Commission arose from the ad hoc nature of the 
existing tax system. The federal income tax was introduced in 1917 in the frenzied 
atmosphere of a grave national emergency during World War I. Ad hoc changes were 
made during World War II and the Korean War. It was noted that: 
The [Canadian] federal taxation was hastily thrown together at its 
origin, was subject to its greatest changes during periods of national 
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stress, that the alterations made in these conditions were on a purely 
pragmatic basis and tended to persist once the crisis had passed, 
and that never yet has there been thorough examination of its 
underlying objectives and philosophy. For half a century we have 
gone along on a hand-to-mouth basis that has produced each year 
more problems than it has ever solved. … It was folly to continue 
it.92 
A Royal Commission on Taxation was appointed in September 1962 with a sweeping 
mandate to examine the federal tax laws of Canada and to make recommendations for 
their improvement. The order-in-council establishing the Commission was signed by 
Robert Bryce, then the Deputy Minister of Finance. Mr. Kenneth Carter, a chartered 
accountant in private practice, was the Chair of the Commission while Mr. Douglas 
Hartle, a young professor at the University of Toronto, was the Research Director. The 
Commission was persuaded that ‘only by establishing some basic underlying 
principles on which to build a solid structure is there any escape from ultimate 
complete frustration’.93  The Commission spent four years studying the tax system in-
depth. It engaged a large group of research staff (which included about 75 
professionals) and held public hearings across the country. It eventually published 30 
separate research studies and received over 300 briefs. The Commission delivered the 
final report to the Government in December 1966 and released it in February 1967.  
The final report contains 2,575 double-spaced, typed pages in six volumes. It was 
known as the Carter Report after its chairman and was described as ‘one of the most 
far-reaching, explosive, revolutionary sets of proposals ever put before the Canadian 
people.’94 The Carter Report ‘is not a series of unrelated ideas and recommendations: 
                                                 
92 J H Perry, ‘Anatomy of a Tax System’ in Twentieth Tax Conference (1967) 7–30, 12. 
93 Ibid. 
94 N Brooks (ed), The Quest for Tax Reform: The Royal Commission of Taxation Twenty Years Later (Carswell, 
1988), 4. [Note: Should this be ‘The Quest for Tax Reform: The Royal Commission of Taxation Twenty Years 
Later]  
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it tells a story, and it tells the story with conciseness, clarity and passion. The story is 
premised on a clear vision of an equitable society’.95  
Public reaction to the Carter Report was mixed. The business community collectively 
opposed the recommendations, which emphasised tax equity and fairness. In 1969, the 
Government tabled a White Paper on Tax Reform, which was a watered-down version 
of the Carter Report. The Finance Minister at the time explained that the reasons for 
the initial abandonment of many of the recommendations ‘were more political and 
administrative than philosophical’. The White Paper was publicly debated. In 1971, 
draft legislation was tabled in the House of Commons and the final legislation was 
passed and became effective in 1972, of which the structure and principles remain 
today. The whole process was open, consultative, evidence-based, principled, and led 
by experts who are not politically motivated. 
China has undertaken several major tax reforms since the inception of the modern tax 
system in the early 1980s. The Chinese tax system was introduced during the period of 
economic transition, largely on an ad hoc basis. It contains legacies of the socialist 
system as well as transplanted foreign ideas and norms. It is certainly due for a 
thorough review, but a public process similar to that of the Carter Commission seems 
unlikely.  The direction for reform comes from the top. For example, the 12th Five-
Year Plan (2011-2015) by the Central Government calls for strengthening the 
regulatory effects on high-income earners,96 ‘making the sharing of the tax burden 
more fair’, ‘gradually establishing an individual income tax system that combines 
comprehension and scheduler features, and perfecting the system of collection and 
administration of individual income tax’.97  Chapter 46 of the 12th Five-Year Plan 
states — that experts and public input must be sought in policy-making and 
                                                 
95 Ibid 6. 
96 The 12th Five Year Plan was approved by the National People’s Congress on 14 March 2011. It sets forth the 
objectives, strategies and measures of economic and social development. See Chapter 32, section 3. 
97 Ibid Chapter 47, section 3. 
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administrative accountability should be widely implemented in order to improve 
public confidence.98 The role of public input is, in practice, limited to commentary on 
specific issues as opposed to ideas and principles or the structure of the tax.   
3.3   Political processes 
3.3.1 Taxation with(out) Representation 
In Canada and other Western democracies, the issue of taxation is highly political. The 
modern notion of taxation is a system of compulsory contributions levied by government on individuals, 
corporations, and properties, primarily as a source of revenue for the government. The power of taxation 
proceeds upon the theory that the existence of government is a necessity. The basis of 
taxation is found in the reciprocal duties of protection and support between the state 
and the taxpayers or the idea of a social contract between citizens and the government. 
The relationship between the government and the people is governed by the rule of 
law. Tax laws are passed by the legislatures and the law-makers are elected by 
citizens. There is a political process for ‘consulting’ taxpayers about their choices. The 
government is accountable to the people about the use of tax revenues through 
budgeting processes and reporting.   
In modern China, the political process is fundamentally different from that of Western 
countries. ‘Members of the National People’s Congress (NPC) are not directly elected 
by the people and most are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Key 
policy decisions are made by the CCP. Article 1 of the Constitution states that  ‘The 
People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic 
dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and 
peasants’. Many provisions of the Constitution spell out what the state promises to do 
for the people. Article 56 states: ‘It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of 
                                                 
98 Ibid Chapter 46. 
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China to pay taxes in accordance with the law’. In the true sense of ‘socialism’, there 
is no need for taxation because taxation is the means of mandatory transfer of wealth 
from the private sector to the government in order to finance public expenditures. In 
reality, it is acknowledged that China’s ‘socialism’ is at an earlier stage and market is 
allowed as the main mechanism for regulating economic activities. As such, taxation is 
relevant.   
The current Chinese system is rooted in the Chinese tradition that emphasises 
morality, duties, and vertical relationships. For example, the relationship between the 
state and taxpayers is framed in terms of a ‘duty’ to support the state.99 The Chinese 
term for ‘state’ is ‘guo jia’ or ‘nation family’. The government is analogised to the 
‘head of the family’. As the head of the family, the government regards the people as 
subjects or children, exercising a top-down model of governance. When the Xia 
Dynasty (BC 2023) levied agriculture tax, it named the levy ‘gong’ or ‘tribute’.100 The 
payment of taxes to the emperor was analogised to supporting one’s parent.101 The 
taxpayers/children’s duty to support the emperor/parent was ‘unconditional’ and it was 
regarded as a moral obligation.102 Emperors did not need to consult with, or account 
to, taxpayers about the level of taxation and the use of tax revenue. Imperial 
governments did not see themselves as providers of services to taxpayers. Without the 
                                                 
99 Jing Fang, ‘Zhongxi Fang Shuishou Falu Wenhua Bijiao Yanjiu’ (‘A Comparative Study on Chinese and 
Western Tax Cultures’) (2003) 16 Journal of Yantai University (Philosophy & Social  Science) 43; Li Linping, 
‘Zhong Xi Fang Shui Shou Wen Hua Zhi Bijiao’ (‘Comparison of Chinese and Western Tax Cultures’) (2005) 8 Li 
Lun Daokan (Journal on Theory) 77, 77–8; Liu Rong & Du Jian, ‘Na Shui Ren Quan Li Bao Hu Yu Wo Guo Shui 
Shou Si Fa Gai Ge’ (‘The Protection of Taxpayers' Rights and Chinese Taxation Judicial Reform’) (2007) 1 
Taxationn Research 51; You Xiaofeng & Wang Zhifang, ‘Shui Shou Qi Yue Yu Na Shui Ren Quan Li Zhi Bao Hu’ 
[‘Taxation Agreement and the Protection of Taxpayers' Rights’] (2008) 2 Taxation Research 69 (in Chinese). 
(Note: As the journal titles are originally in Chinese, can you kindly spell out the abbreviations? Thanks)  
100 Weng, above n 10, 4. 
101 Fang, above n 99; Li, above n 99; Yang Bin, ‘Zhong Xi Fang Wen Hua Chaiyi Yu Shui Zhi Gai Ge’ 
(‘Differences Between Chinese and Western Cultures and Tax Reform — A Case Study of VAT and Personal 
Income Tax’) (2005) 5 Shui Wu Yan Jiu [Tax Research] 14; Yu Daqing & Peng Jiming, ‘Zhong Ying Chuantong 
Shuishou Wenhua Bijiao’ [‘Comparison Between Chinese and English Traditional Tax Cultures’] (2003) 16 
Journal of Xi’an Institute of Fiance and Economics 14 (in Chinese). [Please spell out journal title in full)  
102 Li Qian and Han Yu, ‘Qi Ye Suo De Shui Fa, Yi Ban Fan Bi Shui Tiao Kuan Ping Xi’ (‘Some Comments on 
General Anti-Avoidance Provisions in the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China’) (2008) 
8 International Taxation in China 68; Wang Jianping, ‘Na Shui Ren Quan Li Li Nian Yu Zheng Fu — Na Shui 
Ren Guan Xi De Zhuan Xing’ [‘The Concept of Taxpayers' Right and the Relationship Between the Government 
and Taxpayers’) (2008) 4 International Taxation in China57 (in Chinese). [Please spell out journal title in full] 
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possibility of participating in tax-law making or having an impartial arbiter in 
resolving tax disputes, taxpayers resorted to tax evasion and tax resentment.103     
3.3.2 Rule of Law  
Modern taxation was created in Western countries where the rule of law, market and 
social contract co-existed and operated in tandem. For example, the Canadian tax 
system is based on the principle of rule of law. The principle signifies that ‘all 
elements of Canadian society — public and private, individual and institutional — are 
subject to and governed by known legal rules’.104 Competing and conflicting interests 
and values are managed through an open, political process and the majority or 
compromised view is expressed through legislation. Political leaders and government 
agencies are accountable to the people and the elected legislative respectively. 
Economic relations are regulated by free markets that demand fair dealing, 
transparency, equal exchange, resulting in a win-win outcome. Private property and 
individual rights are protected and regulated by law. There is an implicit social 
contract between taxpayers and the state: the state uses tax revenue to pay its expenses 
on public services whereas taxpayers receive the benefits and protection from the 
government, which attempts to level the playing field and to provide a fair opportunity 
to all of its citizens to realise their potential. These processes are generally open, 
transparent and have built-in checks and balances. 
In a tax context, the rule of law means that taxes must be imposed through a proper 
parliamentary process rather than through administrative or judicial discretion. The 
government as well as the taxpayers must comply with tax laws. The rule of law also 
implies that tax laws must be reasonably capable of discovery and that taxpayers 
should be able to reasonably predict, in advance and with a sufficient degree of 
                                                 
103  Liu, above n 65, 224. 
104  Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, Forward to G L Gall, The Canadian Legal System (5th ed, 2004).   
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certainty, the tax consequences of their actions. It also implies the separation of 
powers and the independence of the judiciary, so that taxpayers can rely on the courts 
to resolve their disputes with the government.   
The Chinese legal system is different; it is not based on the Western notion of the rule 
of law that restrains state power. In ancient China, the ruler was accountable to no one 
and was above the law. The law functioned as an instrument of control. The political 
process required no participation of the people. Regime changes were driven by 
bloody conflicts. The administrative process was highly sophisticated and top officials 
were selected through the keju system. ‘Administrative bureaucracies in China have 
long dominated the process of governance, to the extent that administrative decision 
making virtually eclipsed the law-making authority of the [law maker].’105 Under that 
system, bureaucrats not only enforced laws, but also adjudicated disputes. There was 
no independent judiciary. In modern China, some of these traditions remain. ‘Law is 
not a limit on state power, rather, it is a mechanism by which state power is exercised, 
as the legal forms and institutions that comprise the Chinese legal system are 
established and operate to protect the Party/state’s political power.’106 Deputies to the 
NPC are becoming more active in proposing legislation, ‘although broader data 
suggests that the Party and state bureaucracies continue to dominate most legislative 
proposals’.107 The judiciary is subordinate to the NPC.  
In the Chinese tax context, tax ‘laws’ are promulgated by the NPC, implementation 
regulations are promulgated by the State Council, and specific tax measures are 
introduced by the SAT or the Ministry of Finance. The power to interpret tax laws, 
regulations and measures lies with the body that has the power to enact them, that is, 
the NPC, the State Council and the SAT or the Ministry of Finance. Courts have no 
                                                 
105 P B Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture (2001), 20–1. 
106 Ibid 10. 
107 Ibid 17. 
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general power to interpret tax legislation. Interpretations and decisions of the SAT are 
not generally subject to judicial review. For the first time in Chinese history, starting 
in 1989, certain bureaucratic actions (primarily enforcement actions and penalty 
decisions) became reviewable by the court in accordance with the Administrative 
Litigation Law.108 This law was intended to hold decisions by administrative agencies 
more accountable and to provide remedies for administrative misconduct.109 
3.4   Tax Policy Process 
The process of making tax policy is dictated by the institutional structure and 
processes of each country. In Canada, the Department of Finance is responsible for tax 
policy, which includes formulating amendments to existing statutes, such as the 
Income Tax Act (the ‘Act’), or introducing a new tax: 
 Many amendments are announced in the Minister’s annual budget. The 
Minister of Finance presents a budget to Parliament each year, usually in 
February or March. The budget provides an estimate of the government’s 
revenues and expenditures for the next financial year, which starts on April 1. 
Because of the significance of income taxes for the revenue side, the budget 
usually proposes a set of changes to the Income Tax Act.   
 The Department of Finance is responsible for starting the legislative process in 
amending the Act. It often prepares a ‘notice of ways and means motion to 
amend the Income Tax Act,’ which lists and describes all the amendments to 
the Act that have been proposed. The notice of ways and means motion is 
followed by legislation in draft form. Since 1983, the Department of Finance 
has followed the practice of issuing explanatory notes (or technical notes) to 
                                                 
108 Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted at the Second Session of the 
Seventh National People's 
Congress on April 4, 1989, promulgated by Order No 16 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 
April 4, 1989, and effective as of October 1, 1990). For further discussion, see W Cui, ‘The Rule of Law in 
Chinese Tax Administration’ in C Evans et al, (eds), The Delicate Balance: Tax, Discretion and the Rule of Law 
(2011) 362–3. 
109 The impact of this law can be limited. Potter, above n 105, notes at 24: ‘Since Chinese regulations are drafted to 
give officials maximum discretionary authority and so are often intentionally vague and ambiguous, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to establish that any but the most egregious conduct was actually in violation of existing 
regulations.  And since the courts have expressly been denied power to pass judgment on the propriety of 
administrative decisions that are not in violation of specific laws and regulations, administrative decisions that 
represent abuses of discretion but are technically within the law may not be overturned under the [Administrative 
Litigation Law]’. 
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accompany the draft legislation. This material is helpful in explaining the 
purpose of amendments, which are often exceedingly difficult (even for tax 
professionals) to understand on their own. The purpose of issuing the 
legislation in draft form initially is to provide an opportunity for the tax 
community to comment on the legislation. In fact, commentary is received and 
sometimes does lead to changes in the legislation. 
 Eventually, a bill amending the Act is introduced into the House of 
Commons by the Minister of Finance. That bill then follows the normal 
legislative process, which includes scrutiny by standing committees of both 
the House of Commons and the Senate, and is enacted into law in due 
course.110  
Tax policies in China generally originate from either the SAT or the Ministry of 
Finance. The process of tax policy making in China has become more transparent over 
the past three decades. Public input was sometimes sought and given. An example is 
the 2011 amendment of the Individual Income Tax. In the case of the unprecedented 
process for public input in amending the Individual Income Tax, the process seems to 
be as follows: 
 The Ministry of Finance started the process by involving the relevant 
department of SAT and created a first draft. This draft was submitted to the 
Legal Affairs Office of the State Council, which consulted with relevant 
ministries and departments of government and then generated the second draft.  
 On 1 March  2011, the executive meeting of the State Council approved the 
‘Draft Amendment to the Individual Income Tax Law’. The State Council 
submitted the Draft Amendment to the Standing Committee of the 11th NPC. 
 On 20 April 2011, the Standing Committee of NPC considered the draft 
Amendment,111 and officials from the Ministry of Finance and SAT answered 
questions about the proposed amendment in public.112  
                                                 
110 For further discussion, see B J Arnold and H Kerr, ‘The Canadian Tax Policy Process’ in Kerr, McKenzie and 
Mintz, Tax Policy in Canada (2012), Ch 3; and S D Pollack, ‘Arenas of Federal Tax Policy’ (2012) Tax Notes 
1499–514.   
111 In accordance with the Chinese Law Making Law, upon the receipt of a draft legislation, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress can ask a committee to examine the draft and prepare a report and 
then include the draft legislation on the agenda of the meetings of the Standing Committee. In the case of the 
proposed Individual Income Tax Amendment, the Finance and Economics Committee reviewed the draft and 
suggested changes.   
112 See Officials from the Minister of Finance and State Administration of Taxation Answering Questions from the 
Media, at  <http://www.gov.cn>,  20 April 2011 (in Chinese).   
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 On 25 April 2011, the Office of the Standing Committee of the NPC published 
the Proposed Amendment to the Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (Draft)) and sought public input.  
 From 25 April 2011 to 31 May 2011, 82,707 ‘netizens’ (Internet Users) 
provided input, 181 people wrote letters, and 11 experts and 16 members of 
the public were invited to attend a hearing and give comments on the proposed 
draft amendment.113  
 On June 30, 2011, the Standing Committee of the NPC promulgated the 
decision  
The draft was presumably made public by the State Council when published on its 
website on 2 March 2011.114  As a result of the amendment, 60 million individuals 
were removed from the tax net.115 In general, however, the law-making process in 
China is more opaque:  public input is not often allowed and policy debates are not 
made in public. 
3.5  Tax Administrative Process 
3.5.1  The Agency 
In Canada, federal tax laws are administered by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). 
According to the Canada Revenue Agency Act  (S.C. 1999, c. 17),116 the CRA is 
responsible for, among others, supporting the administration and enforcement of tax 
legislation. The CRA’s website117 states that ‘the CRA is the model for trusted tax and 
benefit administration, providing unparalleled service and value to its clients, and 
offering its employees outstanding career opportunities’. The CRA undertakes to 
                                                 
113  Liao Wengen, ‘Netizens Actively Suggest Amendments to the Individual Income Tax Law: 82707 People 
Made 237684 Suggestions’<http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/grsdsfxz/2011-06/16/content_1659110.htm>. (in 
Chinese). 
114  Office of State Council, 2 March 2011, State Council Discussed and Passed the Draft Amendment to the 
Individual Income Tax Law, at <http://www.gov.cn>.  
115 Wu Yan, ‘60 Million Individuals Are Exempted From Paying Individual Income Tax and Experts Worry About 
Difficulties in Sharing Public Resources’, People’s Daily, 29 July 2011 (in Chinese) 
<http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/07-29/3218426.shtml>. 
116 For the text of this legislation, see <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-10.11/page-2.html>. 
117 See <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/prgrms_srvcs/mssn-eng.html>. 
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contribute to the well-being of Canadians and to the efficiency of government by 
delivering world-class tax and benefit administration that is responsive, effective and 
trusted. It regards integrity as the foundation of its administration and aspires to treat 
people fairly and to apply the law fairly. Professionalism, respect of clients and co-
operation are its key values. The CRA regards taxpayers as its clients and aims to 
provide ‘unparalleled service and value’ to its clients.  
The SAT administers tax laws in China.  In comparison to the CRA, the SAT has a 
much broader mandate. Providing services to taxpayers is among its main 
responsibilities, but not listed as the top one. Its main functions include drafting tax 
laws and regulations, providing tax policy recommendations, enforcing tax laws and 
regulations, interpreting tax law and policy, participating in research on macro-
economic policy and making recommendations on central-local tax sharing, planning 
and organising a system of taxpayer services, protecting taxpayer’s lawful interests, 
formulating and implementing rules to regulate registered tax practitioners, and 
exercising vertical, exclusive control and administration of the national tax system and 
dual control over the local tax administration system. The SAT website makes no 
mention of its values and principles.  
3.5.2 Rules and Procedures 
In Canada, rules and procedures governing the main aspects of tax administration are 
provided in legislation. These rules and procedures are designed to ensure the 
operation of a self-assessment tax system. There are extensive provisions specifying 
the obligations of taxpayers and third parties (including banks, financial institutions, 
employers, etc.) to provide information to the CRA, the powers of the CRA to demand 
information from taxpayers, to audit and assess taxpayers, the duty of the CRA to 
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protect taxpayer information, as well as the duties of tax advisers to the tax system.118 
The administrative process limits the scope of discretion of CRA officials and all 
parties are bound by the same law. The thrust of these rules is that taxpayers are 
presumed honest in reporting their tax obligations and the CRA’s job is to assist 
taxpayers comply with the law and go after those who do not. Transparency is the key. 
Tax avoidance and tax evasion are dealt with differently: the latter is a crime and is 
punishable by imprisonment, whereas the former is lawful, and even if the avoidance 
scheme is found unsuccessful, there is no penalty imposed. The difference between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion lies in deceit: the latter involve fraud and intentional 
misrepresentation of facts, whereas the former involves taking advantage of legislative 
loopholes, but nothing is hidden from the CRA.  
The Chinese Law on Tax Collection and Administration119 provides for many general 
rules that are similar to those in Canada, such as filing tax returns, withholding 
obligations, audit and investigation, and penalties. These rules appear to be ‘heavy 
handed’ in favour of the government as opposed to ‘guides’ for taxpayers to comply 
with the law. These seem to lack a sense of treating taxation as a ‘social’ enterprise, 
that is, banks, financial institutions, other third parties, as well as tax advisers all play 
a role in operating the tax system.  
3.6   Tax Disputes Resolution Process  
3.6.1   Judicial and/or Administrative Processes 
Disputes between taxpayers and the tax administration are resolved through 
administrative reviews and judicial appeals. In Canada, the majority of tax disputes are 
                                                 
118  See Hogg, Magee and Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law (8th ed, 2013), Chapter18. 
119  Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Administration of Tax Collection (hereinafter ‘the Tax 
Administration Law’), adopted at the 27th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's 
Congress on 4 September 1992; amended in 1995, 2001; Implementation Regulations for the Tax Administration 
Law, effective as of 15 October 2002. 
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settled administratively, while a small percentage of disputes end up in court. In 
China, judicial review is rare and administrative review is the norm. 
The system of the rule of law requires an independent judiciary that has exclusive 
jurisdiction over statutory interpretation, including the Constitution and tax statutes. In 
Canada, the courts' role is to interpret and apply the tax legislation as it was adopted 
by Parliament. Judges are not accountable to the government or Parliament. Judges 
regard themselves as ‘arbiters’ of the tax battlefield between the government and 
taxpayers: ‘The role of the court is as arbitrator between the Minister and the taxpayer. 
We are the protectors of neither the public nor the private purse’.120 Courts generally 
interpret tax statutes on the basis of the textual meaning and construct the facts in 
accordance with their legal form (as opposed to their economic substance). Only in 
GAAR cases, judges take on the ‘unusual duty’ of going behind the words of the 
legislation to determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provision or provisions 
relied on by the taxpayer.121 The origin of the Canadian judicial approach towards tax 
avoidance goes back to the Duke of Westminster (1935) case.122 This case established 
the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to arrange his or her affairs to minimise tax. 
This principle is derived from the strict or literal approach to statutory interpretation 
                                                 
120 In tax cases, the government and the taxpayer are equal parties before the court. 
121 In Copthorne v R (2011), Justice Rothstein further clarifies that: ‘[I]f the Court is confined to a consideration of 
the language of the provisions in question, without regard to their underlying rationale, it would seem inevitable 
that the GAAR would be rendered meaningless’ : at [66].  
122 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v The Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1 (House of Lords): ‘The facts in Duke 
of Westminster were straightforward. The Duke of Westminster had a number of household servants. The then 
British Income Tax Act did not allow a deduction of wages of household servants, but allowed a deduction of 
annual payments made in pursuance of a legal obligation other than remuneration of servants. The Duke 
accordingly entered into deeds of covenant with each of his servants under which he undertook to pay each of 
them annual sums for a period of seven years. The payments were to be made irrespective of whether any services 
were performed by the promisee, and were without prejudice to the promisee's entitlement to remuneration if he or 
she did perform any services to the promisor. However, it was established by evidence that the understanding 
between the Duke and his servants was that they would rest content with the provision made for them by deed, and 
would not assert any right to remuneration. In this way, the Duke converted his non-deductible wages obligation 
into a deductible annuity obligation. The deeds were legally effective in that all legal formalities had been carried 
out. Nor were the deeds shams: the Duke had covenanted to pay the annuities for seven years, and had thereby 
assumed the risk of having to continue to pay an annuitant who had stopped working for him or who had insisted 
upon additional remuneration for working for him. Of course, the understanding that the faithful retainers would 
continue to work for him, and would do so without extra charge, virtually eliminated this risk. But the risk was 
genuinely assumed, and none of their lordships regarded the deeds as shams.  The legal form of the transactions 
was found controlling and the Duke was entitled to deduct the payments.’ 
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and the characterisation of transactions based on legal form.123  When the government 
loses a case in court, it can only reverse the decision prospectively through legislative 
amendment.  
The Tax Court of Canada is a specialised court. Although based in Ottawa, the court 
hears cases in different locations across the country. There are two sets of procedures 
for the Tax Court. The informal procedures apply to cases involving a small amount 
and taxpayers do not need to have legal representation. The general procedures apply 
to other cases and require taxpayers be represented by a lawyer. The decision of the 
Tax Court is final unless the losing party appeals the decision to the Federal Court of 
Appeal. The Court of Appeal may overturn or uphold the decision of the Tax Court 
and its decision cannot be automatically appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. A 
leave for appeal must be granted by the Supreme Court before a formal appeal is filed. 
The Supreme Court hears tax cases only when there is an issue of national importance.  
In China, courts do not have the final power of statutory interpretation. The lawmaker 
is also the ‘legitimate’ interpreter. For example, the Constitution provides that the 
NPC has the power of interpretation regarding ‘laws’ and the State Council has the 
power to interpret ‘regulations’.  Chinese courts adjudicate a small number of tax 
disputes that may shed some light on the meaning of tax legislation. Case law is not a 
source of law in China. In reality, the SAT has the actual power of interpretation that 
binds taxpayers. Courts generally hear administrative cases that involve taxpayers 
suing tax officials for their ‘misconduct’.124 These cases are generally concerned with 
                                                 
123 According to strict interpretation, tax could only be imposed if a taxpayer’s situation was literally covered by 
the words of a charging provision; and a taxpayer’s situation was determined by reference to the legal rights and 
obligations created by the taxpayer, not the economic substance. If, therefore, a taxpayer arranged the legal rights 
and obligations so that the statute did not literally apply, tax was avoided despite the fact that the arrangement, 
especially if construed in accordance with its economic substance, might have been within the spirit of the statute. 
124 The Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted on 4 April 1989 at the Second 
Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress, effective 1 October 1990.) The SAT has issued guidelines to 
help local tax offices prepare for the defence, make arguments in court, file appeals and enforce court decisions. 
See Operational Guidelines on Responding to Tax Administrative Appeals (effective 1 January 1995), available at 
the SAT website.   
(2013) Volume 3,  Special  Issue,  Journal of  China Tax and Policy  
125 
 
actions in assessing penalties, enforcing collections, or other aspects of tax 
administration.125  
3.6.2   Role of Tax Professionals 
Lawyers and accountants play an important role in the tax system. In Canada, lawyers 
may represent a client in a controversy with the CRA at the stage of audit, 
administrative appeal within the CRA, or in courts. In this context, the lawyer serves 
as an advocate. Among the duties and obligations, candour towards the tribunal and 
the duty of confidentiality to the client are particularly important. In tax litigation, as 
in other litigation, the lawyer's duties of honesty and candour require that the lawyer 
be scrupulous to never mislead his or her opponent or the court by misstating the facts 
or the law, or by failing to inform the court of a relevant authority. The failure to 
inform the court of a relevant authority is a breach of legal ethics, even if the authority 
is adverse to the client and has been overlooked by the opponent's lawyer. This is an 
example where the lawyer’s obligation to the system trumps or mitigates his/her duty 
of loyalty to the client. Within these constraints, a lawyer is free to urge on behalf of 
the client any position that is fairly arguable, even if the lawyer regard that position as 
unmeritorious. In the role of an advocate (as opposed to an adviser), the lawyer is not 
asserting his or her opinion as to the correct legal position, but is simply submitting 
arguments on behalf of the client. The lawyer leaves the task of evaluating the 
strengths of competing arguments and of determining the correct legal position to the 
court. Traditionally, the ethical obligations of tax lawyers do not differ much from the 
ethical obligations of other lawyers. The same rules of professional conduct apply to 
the practice of tax law. In recent years, however, there has been a trend in Canada and 
                                                 
125 For an empirical study of tax administrative cases in China, see Ji Li, ‘Dare You Sue the Tax Collector! An 
Empirical Study of Administrative Lawsuits Against Tax Agencies in China’ at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256021>. 
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elsewhere to impose additional obligations on tax practitioners, who by virtue of their 
expertise, are viewed as gatekeepers for the tax system.    
In China, tax disputes are resolved primarily through administrative reviews as the 
courts play an insignificant role. Tax practitioners are primarily accountants and tax 
agents.126 Lawyers are involved in tax practice in a more limited manner. Tax agents 
are required to ‘abide tax laws and regulations, to be independent and honest in their 
work, to safeguard state interest, and protect the lawful rights and interests of 
clients’.127 Their duty to the state and duty to the client are parallel, although the 
former is expected to trump the latter in case of any conflict between the two. It is 
interesting to observe that a large tax agency firm, UniTax, states on its website in 
Chinese that its ‘enterprise tenet’ is to ‘serve for national tax, serve for taxpayer’，but 
the order was in their English translated website changed — to ‘serve for taxpayer, 
serve for national tax’.   
3.7 Horizontal versus vertical relationships   
Overall, the tax processes in Canada and other Western countries are more 
‘collaborative’ and the Chinese processes tend to be top-down, dominated by the SAT. 
For example, in Canada, each of the tax institutions (legislature, judiciary, the CRA, 
and tax professionals) plays a role in developing tax law: 
 The legislature formally enacts tax legislation and is the supreme body of 
law-making.  
 The judiciary contributes to tax law development in at least three ways. First, 
courts clarify the meaning of statutory provisions through the exercise of 
                                                 
126  SAT issued Interim Regulations on Tax Agents in September 1994; Interim Regulations on the Qualifications 
of Registered Tax Agents on 22 November 1996 (together with the Human Resources Ministry); and Interim 
Regulations on the Administration of Registered Tax Agency Firms, effective 1 February 2006.  Registered tax 
agents and tax firms are emerging. Some tax firms, such as UniTax (http://www.uni-tax.com), are employing over 
1,000 people and rendering tax services to some prominent clients. One of its founders, Mr Zhizhong Liu, has 
recently been appointed as a member of the Tax Appeals Review Committee of the SAT. 
127 Ibid. Art 19 of the Interim Regulations on the Administration of Registered Tax Agency Firms. 
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statutory interpretation. For example, the concept of ‘income’ has been 
interpreted by Canadian courts to exclude gambling winnings or gifts. 
Second, court decisions that are deemed incorrect are overruled through 
legislative amendment. Finally, some tax principles  are well entrenched in 
the tax culture but not codified into tax statutes. These principles include: the 
right of taxpayers to arrange their affairs in any manner possible to minimise 
taxation, the characterisation of facts in accordance with the legal form, and 
that any ambiguity in a statutory provision should be interpreted in favour of 
the taxpayer.  
 The CRA contributes to the development of tax law by participating in tax 
policy formulation, tax law drafting, and enforcing tax rules, especially the 
general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR).   
 Tax professionals, especially tax planners and tax litigation lawyers, often 
push the limit of tax law by taking advantage of the ‘loopholes’ or advancing 
innovative positions on statutory interpretation. In court proceedings, lawyers 
representing the taxpayer provide the court with legal arguments to support 
their client’s case in a manner that is grounded in law and reasoning. In an 
adversarial system, the two parties battle to win the case, each acting as the 
adversary of the other.  It provides a procedure for the parties to present and 
resolve their case, in as fairly a manner as possible. The court is thus 
presented with two sets of arguments and its decision is thus better informed 
than otherwise.  
Before the law, taxpayers and the CRA are equal. Tax compliance and tax planning 
can be analogised to a card game. The CRA’s cards are all on the table, faced up; the 
taxpayer does not need to show his or her cards until the end of the game. In case of 
any disputes, the referee (i.e., the court) decides the winner. If the CRA does not like 
the cards or the decision of the referee, it must go back to the legislature for new cards 
or new rules of the game. The taxpayer and his or her tax advisors have opportunities 
to say if the new cards or new rules are fair. The game then continues.  
4.   Case Study of China’s Tax Transplants 
The phenomenon of tax transplants in China discussed earlier confirms the validity of 
the theory that legal borrowing is a main source of legal change. This Part of the paper 
discusses some challenges in transplanting foreign tax laws into China and the 
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experiences drawn from the transplantation of two tax principles: progressive income 
tax and arm’s length principle.  
 4.1   Processes of Transplantation  
4.1.1  Selection 
China has not transplanted an entire tax system or tax law from the West. It has always 
selected appropriate tax concepts, rules or principles that solve a specific tax problem 
and suit China’s needs. Throughout Chinese history, there has been no Western 
religion, language, medicine or law that could displace the indigenous Chinese 
counterpart. For example, Western medicine co-exists with traditional Chinese 
medicine. Thus, foreign transplants must meet China’s needs.   
Potential candidates for transplants can be identified through various means, including 
research using print or online sources, in-country presentations by foreign experts, 
short-term study visits to foreign countries, officials studying in a foreign country for 
an extended period of time (including LLM in tax programs), and attending 
international tax conferences. Since it is often easier to find a specific rule or 
legislative provision (law on paper) than to find the rationale for such provision (the 
political or policy process) and how it is actually applied (administrative process and 
judicial process), what tends to be transplanted is the substantive rule.   
4.1.2 Life Cycle   
Whether a transplant meets China’s needs depends on many factors. One of the factors 
is the ‘life cycle’ of the transplant. A tax system or tax idea may have a ‘life cycle’. 
For example, it was suggested that progressive taxation becomes a concern at the early 
state of national economic development and becomes less pressing when a country 
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reaches a more mature phase.128 A tax system undergoes changes at different stages of 
maturity. A tax norm that suits the need of a mature economic system may not be 
appropriate for an emerging economy.  
China has transplanted tax norms from mature tax systems, whose specific context for 
introducing the norm and the stage of the ‘life cycle’ of the tax system differ 
significantly from that of China. For example, the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) 
was recently introduced in Australia (1981), Canada (1988), and the United States 
(2010), almost a century after the introduction of income tax, in order to counter 
aggressive tax planning structures that were held acceptable by the courts. 129 China 
introduced the GAAR as part of its consolidated Enterprise Income Tax Law (2007). 
Its motivations were different from, for example, that of Canada. To begin with, 
introduction of the GAAR was not in reaction to any adverse court decision. The main 
purpose of the GAAR is to combat ‘hidden’ or ‘unforeseeable’ tax avoidance 
transactions. ‘No matter how airtight the tax law system is, loopholes always exist’.130 
GAAR seems to mainly target cross-border transactions. Another possible motivation 
is ‘scientific’ drafting so that the law on paper looks comprehensive. Compared with 
the Canadian GAAR, the Chinese GAAR is primarily meant to be proactive, 
empowering the SAT to attack emerging aggressive tax planning transactions.   
                                                 
128 Livingston, 2010, above n 3, 38. 
129 In Canada, the triggering court case is Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen  [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536. In that case, 
the taxpayer transferred the business losses of one subsidiary to another subsidiary for tax purposes through a 
series of transactions on paper. The Income Tax Act treats each corporation as a separate entity and does not 
generally allow a consolidation of losses between related companies. The taxpayer achieved consolidation by 
selling the profit-making business to the loss company and then appointing the profit-making company to manage 
the business as an agent. There are specific anti-avoidance rules, but the Supreme Court of Canada found these 
rules inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court relied on the number and variety of these specific anti-avoidance 
measures that were in existence at the time to buttress its conclusion that the Court of its own motion should not 
create a business purpose test that had not been enacted by Parliament. Since none of the specific anti avoidance 
measures caught the situation in that case, the Court reasoned that it should not assume the power to disregard 
genuine legal arrangements simply because of their tax avoidance motivation. The lesson that the Department of 
Finance drew from the reasoning in Stubart was that the Income Tax Act ought to include a general anti-avoidance 
rule, which would cover such a broad range of tax avoidance activity that an unforeseen device such as that 
employed in Stubart would not fall through the cracks again. The GAAR was enacted as a “defensive” measure 
and as the last resort.  
130  SAT, Guidelines for Public Education of the Spirit of the New Enterprise Income Tax Law, Circular No 59, 5 
Feb 2008, available at the SAT website: <http:// www.chinatax.gov.cn>  
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The GAAR is used in mature tax systems to ‘invite’ the courts to play a more active 
role in protecting the tax base, but such use is currently not an issue in China — the 
life cycle of the GAAR is comparable, the life cycle of the tax system is not. As a 
result, the operation of the GAAR is bound to be different in China. An appreciation 
of the different processes that led to the enactment of the GAAR in Canada, US and 
Australia may shed more light on the application of the GAAR in China, especially 
with respect to multinational companies based in these countries. 
4.1.3 Translation  
One of the first steps of tax transplantation is to translate a foreign rule into Chinese.131 
Anyone who speaks more than one language and has attempted translation can attest 
to the fact that it can be truly difficult, if possible at all, to achieve perfect translation. 
The criteria for ‘good’ translation include: a faithful reproduction of the information 
given in the source language test, correct, taking implicit factors and complementary 
information into account.132 Literal translation is generally not good enough. Faithful 
and correct translation requires more than linguistic skills.  
Translation of foreign tax laws into Chinese imposes an additional layer of complexity 
because of the technical aspects. The translator should ideally have linguistic skills as 
well as tax knowledge. To do a good translation, the translator should ideally 
understand the context in which the tax norm is used. In other words, it is not just 
words that are translated, but the concepts or even the way of thinking. It cannot be 
denied that some concepts are not easy for translation. For example, both ‘tax equity’ 
and ‘tax fairness’ are translated into ‘shui shou gong ping’ (税收公平). The Chinese 
words ‘gong’ and ‘ping’ together imply justice and proportionality and not much of 
                                                 
131 Ibid.   
132 See P Newmark, About Translation (Multilingual Matters Limited, 2nd ed, 1993), 162; S W Chan, A Dictionary 
of Translation Technology (Chinese University Press, 2004), 90; J Munday, Introducing Translation Studies: 
Theories and Applications (Routledge, 1st ed,  2001). [Please provide publisher details too. Thanks.]  
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procedural fairness as it was embedded in the English concept. Another term is ‘arm’s 
length’. The literal meaning of ‘arm’s length’ is to ‘the length of one’s arm’. ‘Arm’s 
length principle’ is translated into ‘独立交易原则’ (‘principle of independent transactions’) 
in Enterprise Income Tax Law, Article 41.   
The translator may misread the source country or misunderstand its own country. 
Legal doctrines or institutions evolve and develop over time, often not in response to a 
particular objectively defined social need, but as a result of a complex interplay of 
social forces with different agendas.133 Understanding the cultural context in its home 
country (often the United States) is important to the accuracy of the translation and the 
fate of the transplant in China. Because taxation is an important public policy 
instrument, it is by nature a field of contestation for different groups with radically 
differing goals. The final tax law reflects a compromise of various competing interests 
or an outcome of processes that may be unique to the source country. The lack of 
proper understanding of the different processes in China and the West may result in 
superficial translation.134 
4.1.4   Adaptation  
The process of adopting foreign tax rules into domestic law and the process of 
ensuring the borrowed rules adapt to the local environment are related and critical to 
the success of tax transplants. Several considerations may be relevant. Presumably, 
adopting a foreign rule that has a good ‘genetic’ quality and fits well in more than one 
country, especially one that has some similarities with the Chinese environment, 
would have a better chance of adaptation in China. In the area of personal income tax, 
an example might be the jurisdictional principles that look at a person’s residence or 
the territorial source of income. Moreover, adopting a scheme of taxation as opposed 
                                                 
133 D C Clark,  ‘Lost in Translation? Corporate Legal Transplants in China’ (Public Law Research Paper No 213, 
George Washington University Law School, 10 July 2006) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=913784>. 
134 Ibid. 
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to a specific rule out of context would have a better chance of adaptation. Similarly, 
transplanting the necessary tax processes along with the substantive tax rules would 
facilitate the adaptation of the transplants. 
The gap between law on paper and law in action is often determined by administrative 
conditions and institutional capacity. Tax rules that are sound in tax policy and work 
well in a developed country may not function well in China. One key condition is the 
compatibility of a transplanted rule with Chinese tax processes. For example, the 
progressive tax principle is most sensitive to local political and administrative 
processes, whereas the arm’s length principle is less sensitive to political process, but 
very sensitive to administrative processes. On paper and in reality, China is successful 
in transplanting the arm’s length principle, but not the progressive tax principle.   
4.2   Progressive tax Principle 
Progressive taxation is a fundamental Western principle of personal income taxation. 
Personal income tax is particularly adaptable to the graduated rates that makes it 
progressive. This is because taxpayers typically cannot shift the tax to others. It can be 
designed to take account of the personal circumstances of each taxpayer, and in 
particular the total amount of the taxpayer’s income, his or her family circumstances, 
and other factors which bear on the taxpayer’s ability to pay. That is why personal 
income tax is the only progressive tax in Western countries. 
The idea is that tax burdens should be proportionate to the taxpayer’s ability to pay 
reflects a society’s sense of fairness.135 Fairness is sometimes considered the glue of a 
democratic society.136 It is a key issue to consider when designing a tax regime. Once 
                                                 
135  ‘The search for fairness is one of the most enduring of the shared goals of a civilized society’: Brooks, above n 
94, 6 (citing Douglas Hartle’s remarks about the Royal Commission on Taxation created in 1962 to study tax 
reform in Canada). 
136 R M Bird and J S Wilke, ‘Chapter 2: Tax Policy Objectives’ in Tax Policy in Canada, above n 110, at 2:3. 
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a certain level of government spending and taxation is accepted, how the tax burden is 
shared among the taxpayers becomes the tax policy question. The benefit principle and 
the ability to pay principle provide some insights into thinking about the fairness 
question. 
The benefit principle suggests that taxpayers contribute in proportion to the benefit 
they derive from the government. It assumes that taxes are the purchase of 
governmental services by taxpayers. In Canada, a person’s ability to earn income 
depends to a substantial extent on a number of factors, such as the existence of a 
vibrant civil society, good legal system, health care, educational and public safety 
systems, and opportunities produced by a dynamic economy, which, in turn, depend 
on a sound legal system that defines and protects property rights and regulates the 
function of the markets. 
The ability to pay principle suggests that contributions to the expenses of government 
should be apportioned so that each person ‘shall feel neither more nor less 
inconvenience from his share of the payment than any other person experiences from 
his’.137 This principle demands that persons with greater ability to pay tax do so at a 
higher rate. A person with a low income needs all or most of the income simply to 
survive. A person with a high income can provide for necessities and have a 
substantial amount left over. The taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes is determined by the 
amount of income available for discretionary use. In general, the greater the total 
income, the higher the fraction of that income is available for discretionary use. The 
ability to pay principle dictates not merely that upper-income taxpayers should pay 
more dollars in tax than lower-income taxpayers, but that upper-income taxpayers 
should pay a greater proportion of their income in tax than lower-income taxpayers. 
This conclusion necessitates a progressive rate schedule.  
                                                 
137  Mill, Principles of Political Economy (Longmans, Green, 1923), Bk 5, Ch 2, sec 2. (Note: Any publisher 
details available?) 
Business Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility and Taxation – Chinese Policy and Practice 
134 
 
The Western notion of fairness based on ability to pay or benefit theory does not have 
a natural fit in the Chinese culture. The Chinese tradition is derived from the 
Confucianism and from its assumptions about authority and hierarchy in social 
organisation. 138  The Confucian concept of li (propriety or virtue) dominated the 
regulation of social relationships and held that these were inherently unequal. The 
hierarchical social structures resulted from the li were deemed essential to the orderly 
existence of society. On the other hand, the inherent inequality of social relations was 
accepted as it proceeded from an assumption of the basic natural equality of men and 
that man was born with equal natural abilities and characteristics, and any 
achievement of status was deemed to be the result of superiority in acquired virtue.139 
In other words, higher social status can be earned through hard work, education and 
exam writing skills. During imperial China, the bureaucracy was open to men who 
passed the highly demanding examinations (ke ju kao shi) and higher-level positions 
were offered to higher scorers. Those who aspired to a career in the imperial service 
had to submit to three stages of gruelling tests conducted in specially built exam 
centres. It was the most able and most driven candidates who passed the 
examination.140 In ancient times, the exams were virtually the only path to a privileged 
life for common people and that made the national keju competition extremely fierce. 
Once successful, power and perks accompany the position obtained. A old Chinese 
saying goes ‘yi ren de dao, ji quan sheng tian’ (When a man becomes an official, even 
his chickens and dogs receive privileges.) The society accepted the inequalities in 
social standing, economic wealth, and/or political power as natural and as merely the 
                                                 
138 Potter, above n 105, 7. 
139 Ibid 8–9. See also D J Munro, The Concept of Man in Contemporary China (University of Michigan Press, Ann 
Arbor, 1977), 1-22. 
140 But with its strong emphasis on the Four Books and Five Classics of Confucianism, with their bewildering 
431,286 characters to be memorised, and the rigidly stylised eight-legged essay introduced in 1487, it was an exam 
that rewarded conformity and caution. It was fiercely competitive, no doubt, but it was not the kind of competition 
that promotes innovation, much less the appetite for change. See N Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest 
(The Penguin Press HC, 2011), at 43.   
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result of varying degrees of attained virtue. 141  There was no popular demand for 
redistribution.  
In contemporary China, the attitude towards tax equity and fairness has evolved. Until 
the economic reforms, income inequality was not a major concern.  Income disparity 
started to grow after the adoption of the policy to ‘let some people become rich 
first’. 142  Some people became rich through entrepreneurship, investment and 
speculative adventures. Some amassed wealth through rent seeking or profited from 
each wave of reforming/privatising state-owned enterprises or assets. Overall, it can be 
said that the main reason for the growing disparity is that income was earned through 
monopoly and illegal activities.143 There has been a growing public resentment of such 
disparity. And yet, the official policy of allowing some people to become rich first is 
at odds with progressive taxation. The Chinese Individual Income Tax is progressive 
only with respect to wages, salaries and income from private businesses. It does not 
capture grey income arising from rent seeking, illegal income or income from the 
informal sector. There is no clear consensus or a political process for developing such 
consensus on the ways of improving equity and fairness.  
Progressive tax rates were part of the new Individual Income Tax Law introduced in 
1980. The political process that resulted in progressive taxation in the West was not 
transplanted, for obvious reasons. The administrative processes to ensure reporting and 
paying progressive taxes by individuals were not transplanted. Instead of self-
assessment, reinforced by third-party information reporting of income and source 
withholding of taxes, the Chinese Individual Income Tax relies on final withholding of 
taxes on a payment-by-payment basis, which makes it impossible to impose tax based 
on the ability to pay. There is also strong social support for the collection of this tax as 
                                                 
141 Potter, above n 105, 9. 
142 Attributable to Deng Xiaoping, the leader of China who started the economic reforms in the late 1970s.  
143 Liu, above n 65, 138. 
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banks, institutions and payers [this is right and understandable by our readers]of 
investment income (such as corporations) are not legally required to assist the 
government in collecting the tax. As a result, although it has been part of the Chinese 
tax system since the inception of the modern tax system, the progressive tax principle 
has not taken root in China. 144 
4.3 Arm’s Length Principle 
The arm’s length principle is a widely adopted principle that deals with the problem of 
transfer pricing. Transfer pricing refers to practices of multinational corporations to 
price their intra-group transactions prices in order to minimise their global tax 
liability.145 The arm’s length principle is found in the tax laws of OECD countries and 
many developing countries. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are regarded as 
standard guidelines. These Guidelines provide detailed commentaries and guidance on 
the meaning of the arm’s length principle, the methodologies for determining the 
arm’s length price, and processes for diagnosing transfer pricing problems, procedures 
for documenting and reporting information by taxpayers, processes for negotiating 
advance pricing agreements, and the process of resolving tax disputes. The CRA has 
incorporated these guidelines into its administrative policies in administering section 
247 of the Income Tax Act.146  
The arm’s length principle was not introduced in China until 1988, even though the 
first corporate income tax was introduced in 1980.147  It was codified into law in 
                                                 
144 For further discussion, see R Krever and H Zhang, ‘Progressive Income Taxation and Urban Individual Income 
Inequality’ (2011) Asia-Pacific Tax Bulleten 192; Jinyan Li, ‘China’s Individual Income Tax: A 26-Year-Old 
Infant’ (2006) Tax Notes International 297; Liu, above n 65. 
145 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (2010) (the ‘OECD Guidelines’) 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm>. 
146 Canadian Revenue Agency, Information Circular, IC87-2R International Transfer Pricing (27 September 1999) 
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic87-2r/>. 
147 Supra note 15.  [Which reference in footnote 15? Please clarify] – there is only one A Easson and J Li, 
‘Taxation of Foreign Business and Investment in the People’s Republic of China’ (1985–1986) New Jersey 
International Law & Business 666 
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1991.148 Almost simultaneously, the SAT issued interpretation circulars to provide 
more details on the implementation of the arm’s length principle.149  Following several 
years of experience with transfer pricing, the SAT revised the transfer pricing circular 
in 1998 — ‘Tax Administration Rules and Procedures for Transactions between 
Associated Enterprises’ (Trial). 150  The revised circular marked the beginning of 
China’s transfer pricing administration system.151 It incorporated much of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and reflected some of the best practices in other countries. 
In 2004, the SAT further revised the transfer pricing circular152 and released a new 
circular on APAs — ‘Implementation Rules for Advance Pricing Agreements 
Governing Transactions between Related Enterprises (Trial)’.153 The year 2004 was 
known in China as the year of anti-avoidance.154  In 2005, the SAT established a 
national anti-avoidance case monitoring and management system.155 The arm’s length 
principle was included in the current Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law) and the 
Implementation Regulations, promulgated in 2007.156  The SAT issued a revised, more 
detailed circular specifying the methodologies and processes for  implementing the 
                                                 
148 Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Administration of Tax Collection, adopted at the 27th 
meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on 4 September 1992; amended in 
1995, 2001; Implementation Regulations for the Tax Administration Law, effective as of 15 October 2002.   
149 In 1992, the tax authorities published a circular entitled ‘The Implementation Measures for the Tax 
Administration of Transactions between Associated Enterprises’ (Guo Shui Fa No 237 (1992)), to explain the 
standards for the identification of associated enterprises, annual information to be reported and other fundamental 
issues.  
150 Guo Shui Fa No 59 (1998) (hereinafter ‘the 1998 Transfer Pricing Circular’). This circular was comprised of 52 
articles which are organized in 12 chapters. In October 2002, the State Council introduced Implementation Rules 
for Tax Collection and Administration Law, Articles 51 to 56 of which provide detailed rules for transfer pricing, 
which incorporated many provisions in the 1998 Transfer Pricing Circular.  
151  For a rather detailed account of the history of the Chinese transfer pricing system, see Transfer Pricing Tax 
System and Its Development in China, which was purportedly prepared by the State Administration of Taxation, 
online: <http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/chinatrprice02.pdf> (hereinafter ‘the Unofficial SAT Document on 
Transfer Pricing’).  
152 SAT Circular, Guo Shui Fa No 143 (2004). 
153 SAT Circular, Guo Shui Fa No 118 (2004).  
154 China Tax News (2 September 2009).  
155 Ibid. By the end of 2007, 174 taxpayers had been subjected to transfer pricing audits, 152 of which had been 
reassessed, resulting in over RMB1.2 billion.  
156 EIT Law, above n 19.     
Business Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility and Taxation – Chinese Policy and Practice 
138 
 
arm’s length principle — ‘Measures for the Implementation of Special Tax 
Adjustment (Trial)’ (2009). These Measures largely track the OECD Guidelines.157  
Judging by the volume of rules and procedures introduced by the SAT and the near 
complete ‘transplantation’ of the OECD Guidelines, the Chinese transplantation of the 
arm’s length principle is a huge success. In fact, the Chinese SAT has become very 
sophisticated in implementing the arm’s length principle and recently begun to play a 
role in further refinement of principle through the work of the United Nations.158 As 
such, judging by the gap between the transplanted law on paper and the law in reaction, 
the Chinese transplantation of the arm’s length principle is also successful.   
Unlike the transplantation of the progressive tax principle, the transplantation of the 
arm’s length principle is less dependent on the political process. Securing a fair share 
of the profit of multinational corporations for Chinese tax purposes serves China’s 
national interest. In order to secure China’s ‘fair’ share of global profit, China needs to 
follow the international norms that are defined by the OECD and followed by other 
countries. Chinese traditional values and culture are less relevant to the transplantation 
of the arm’s length principle and its associated processes because the problem of 
transfer pricing is new and solutions could not be home-grown. Moreover, because the 
arm’s length principle relies on effective administrative processes for implementation, 
it ‘fits’ with the strong bureaucratic tradition in China. It is the transplantation of the 
processes that ensures the successful transplantation of the arm’s length principle. 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper teases out some arguments about the importance of process in tax 
transplants. Because processes are arguably sensitive to local political, socio-legal and 
                                                 
157 See Explanation of the EIT Regulations published on SAT’s website: <http://www.chinatax.gov.cn>. 
158 United Nations,  Transfer Pricing Manual — China (2012) 
<http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf>. 
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economic conditions of a country, it is imperative that they are taken into 
consideration in the process of tax transplants. To the extent possible, the 
transplantation of substantive rules, principles or norms should be accompanied by 
transplanting the necessary processes.  Alternatively, the recipient country should 
beware of the demands for processes of the transplanted tax law and strive to create 
the necessary processes to ensure its adaptation. The correct selection and translation 
of Western tax laws is a precondition to successful transplants.   
In terms of contribution to literature, this paper singles out tax processes as a key 
factor that affects the success of tax transplants. The case study of the Chinese tax 
transplants builds on existing literature on the theories of legal transplants and on the 
unique features of tax transplants. This paper adds to existing literature by 
demonstrating that the apparent convergence in tax law (e.g., progressive tax principle 
and arm’s length principle) in Canada and China does not mean convergence in 
reality, owing to different tax processes. The paper also contributes to literature by 
demonstrating that tax processes are the product of local political, socio-legal culture. 
If a transplanted tax principle or rule is accompanied with a transplant of the 
associated processes, it has a greater chance of success in the recipient country.  
Research for this paper has several limitations. One limitation is the lack of any 
standard to measure the success of the Chinese transplantation of progressive tax 
principle or the arm’s length principle. The paper relies, instead, on presumptive 
evidence, such as the extent of legislative and administrative rules. The other 
limitation is the lack of empirical evidence that links the effectiveness of tax 
transplants to tax processes. Hopefully, these drawbacks can be remedied by further 
research. 
  
